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PREFACE 
 
 This textbook is about the modern military justice system of the United 
States.  It covers court-martial procedures, substantive criminal law, and 
nonjudicial punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in 
addition to other administrative and disciplinary measures.  The book also 
addresses both the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which gives the 
federal courts jurisdiction over certain acts committed abroad, and the 
Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009, which created military 
tribunals for trying enemy belligerents. 
   The military justice system serves the nation as a whole by helping to 
establish and maintain good order and discipline in the Armed Forces, 
making our military power more reliable and effective.  The system also 
strives to treat fairly and appropriately the millions of American service 
members who are subject to it.  For these reasons, we have sought to make 
the textbook accessible to a wide audience.  We believe that it is suitable for 
all law students, whether or not they hope to pursue military careers, and also 
for non-law students such as cadets, midshipmen, officer candidates, and 
others who have an interest in the subject of military justice.  The book 
focuses on what is common to all of the Armed Forces—the Air Force, the 
Army, the Coast Guard, the Marine Corps, and the Navy—while noting 
certain differences among them.   To make this book especially relevant to 
cadets and midshipmen, we have addressed a number of cases arising out of 
the U.S. Air Force Academy, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, U.S. Military 
Academy, and U.S. Naval Academy.1  No prior knowledge of military matters, 
however, is necessary for using this book. 
 Each of the authors has extensive practical experience with the military 
justice system.  Dean Lisa Schenck served on active duty in the U.S. Army 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps for more than 25 years, retiring with the 
rank of Colonel.  Following various assignments as a military lawyer and 
professor at the U.S. Military Academy, she was appointed an appellate 
military judge on the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals and, in 2005, she 
became the first female Senior Judge on that court.  In 2007, the Secretary of 
Defense appointed her to serve concurrently as an Associate Judge on the 
U.S. Court of Military Commission Review.  After retiring from the military, 
Dean Schenck served as Senior Advisor to the Defense Task Force on Sexual 
                                                          
1 The cases involving cadets and midshipmen are United States v. Perry, 48 M.J. 197  
(C.A.A.F. 1998) [p. 340]; United States v. Van Vliet, 64 M.J. 539 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
2006) [p. 358]; United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 445 (C.A.A.F.  2010) [p. 425]; United 
States v. Gibson, 39 M.J. 319 (C.M.A. 1994) [p. 435]; United States v. Green, 58 M.J. 
855 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2003) [p. 452]; United States v. Conliffe, 67 M.J. 127 
(C.A.A.F. 2009) [p. 511]; and United States v. Powell, 55 M.J. 633 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. 2001) [p. 538]. 
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Assault in the Military Services.  She now teaches Military Justice at the 
George Washington University Law School, where she is also a senior 
administrator.  Professor Gregory E. Maggs is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. 
Army Reserve, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, and is currently assigned as a 
reserve military appellate judge on the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals.  
In previous reserve assignments, he has served as a prosecutor, as an 
appellate attorney for both the government and the defense, and as an adviser 
on policies concerning the military justice system and military commissions.  
In addition, the Secretary of Defense appointed Professor Maggs to serve as a 
civilian member of the Military Justice Code Committee, a body established 
by Congress to oversee the military justice system.  See Article 146, UCMJ, 10 
U.S.C. § 946. 
 The views expressed in this book are the personal views of the authors, 
and are not intended to represent the views of the U.S. Army, the Department 
of Defense, or the U.S. government.  The textbook contains several cases in 
which we have had personal involvement as military judges.  We find that 
these cases are of particular interest to our students.  But by including them, 
we do not mean to suggest that they are the definitive words on the subjects 
that they address.  
 Throughout this book we have used the following editorial conventions.  
When editing cases, we have used three asterisks (* * *) to indicate an 
omitted paragraph or paragraphs.  We have used ellipses (. . .) to indicate 
omitted words or sentences within a paragraph.  We also have slightly 
changed the format of certain citations within quoted materials to promote 
uniformity throughout the textbook.  We recommend that anyone citing the 
materials included in this book consult the original sources. 
 The book cites the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) in numerous places.  
The MCM contains the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of 
Evidence, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and many other relevant 
materials.  While this book is available for purchase in printed form, we 
recommend that students download it for free (as most military attorneys 
do).  It is available at http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf. 
 Finally, we are extremely grateful for the assistance of Colonel (ret.) Mark 
Harvey, formerly a senior judge on the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals 
and mentor to both of us, for carefully reading the entire manuscript and 
making invaluable suggestions.  We thank Alexis McClellan and Erica Geiser 
of the George Washington University Law School staff for help in preparing 
this manuscript.  We also heartily thank George Washington Law School 
students and recent graduates Elizabeth Barnes, Captain Brandon W. 
Barnett, Karl Brozyna, Tal Castro, Aditya Luthra, and Kenneth Rotter for 
their extremely helpful research assistance.  Finally, we express our great 
appreciation to Louis Higgins of West Academic Publishing for his support 
and encouragement throughout the process. 
 PREFACE vii  
 
 We hope that you will find this book both useful and interesting.  We 
would be happy to hear your reactions so that we may make improvements to 
future editions. 
 
 Gregory E. Maggs 
 Lisa M. Schenck 
 Washington, D.C. 
 February 2012 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY 
 JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
1-1. History of the Military Justice System and Sources of Law 
 In the 1770s, acrimonious disputes arose between the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and the inhabitants of some of its colonies in North America. 
The disagreements concerned taxation, self-governance, individual rights, 
and western expansion.  Harsh measures by the Crown and Parliament 
prompted rebellious actions by the colonists.  Armed conflict erupted on April 
18-19, 1775, when British troops garrisoned in Boston unsuccessfully at-
tempted to seize colonial weapons at nearby Lexington and Concord.  The 
British Army was forced to retreat to Boston, where it was besieged by vol-
unteer New England militiamen.  Shortly afterward, representatives from the 
various colonies met in Philadelphia to address the crisis.  The gathering of 
these representatives became known as the Second Continental Congress. 
 On June 14, 1775, the Second Continental Congress voted to create the 
Continental Army, a military force that has existed continuously for more 
than two centuries and that is now known as the United States Army.  The Se-
cond Continental Congress resolved that ten “companies of expert riflemen 
be immediately raised” and that “each company, as soon as compleated, shall 
march and join the army near Boston, to be there employed as light infantry, 
under the command of the chief Officer in that army.”  2 Journals of the Con-
tinental Congress 90 (1775).  The same day that Congress created the Army, 
Congress also formed a committee to prepare “a dra’t of Rules and regula-
tions for the government of the army.”  Id.  This committee, whose members 
included George Washington and four others, soon afterward proposed sixty-
nine “Articles of War” based on British and colonial military law.  Id. at 112-
123. 
 These Articles of War, which Congress approved on June 30, 1775, speci-
fied offenses that could be tried by a court-martial. Here are two typical ex-
amples: 
 Art. VII. Any officer or soldier, who shall strike his superior officer, or 
draw, or offer to draw, or shall lift up any weapon, or offer any violence 
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against him, being in the execution of his office, on any pretence whatso-
ever, or shall disobey any lawful commands of his superior officer, shall 
suffer such punishment as shall, according to the nature of his offence, be 
ordered by the sentence of a general court-martial. 
 Art. VIII. Any non-commissioned officer, or soldier, who shall desert, or 
without leave of his commanding officer, absent himself from the troop or 
company to which he belongs, or from any detachment of the same, shall, 
upon being convicted thereof, be punished according to the nature of his 
offence, at the discretion of a general court-martial. 
Id. at 113. 
 On June 20, 1775, the Second Continental Congress appointed George 
Washington to be the “General and Commander in chief, of the army of the 
United Colonies, and of all the forces now raised, and to be raised, by them.”  
Id. at 100-101.  Just a few days later, on June 29, 1775, Washington asked 
Congress to appoint a Harvard-educated and successful Boston lawyer, Wil-
liam Tudor, to be the Judge Advocate of the Continental Army, the army’s top 
legal officer.  John Marshall, who later would become Chief Justice of the 
United States, served as the Deputy Judge Advocate of the Army.  Among the 
15 or so other judge advocates in the Army during the Revolution, several 
subsequently became members of the House of Representatives or Senate 
and one became a governor.  See The Army Lawyer: The History of the 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps 1775-1975 10-12, 23-24 (1975). 
 Why was it immediately necessary for the Second Continental Congress to 
create a military justice system for the new Army?  Why did the Army imme-
diately need extremely capable lawyers among its officers?  These questions 
traditionally have yielded two standard answers. 
 One answer concerns the need for military discipline.  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, a separate military law is needed because the military is 
“. . . a specialized society separate from civilian society” with “laws and 
traditions of its own [developed] during its long history.”  Parker v. Levy, 
417 U.S. [733, 743 (1973)]. . . . To prepare for and perform its vital role, the 
military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without coun-
terpart in civilian life.  The laws and traditions governing that discipline 
have a long history; but they are founded on unique military exigencies as 
powerful now as in the past. 
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975). 
 The second answer concerns mobility.  The military often operates where 
civil authority does not exist.  When deployed against enemies, whether in the 
Middle East, Asia, Europe, or elsewhere, U.S. Armed Forces must carry their 
justice system with them.  They cannot postpone addressing disciplinary 
problems until the fighting stops and all can go home.  The Supreme Court 
has explained:  “Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within 
the military ranks there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of com-
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pelling obedience and order.”  United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 
11 (1955). 
Points for Discussion 
 1. How do the offenses stated in Articles VII and VIII of the 1775 Articles 
of War illustrate the idea that a separate military law is required because of 
the unique need for order and discipline in the military? 
 2. During the Revolutionary War, who would have tried soldiers for of-
fenses if not courts-martial?  Who would have assisted with the legal issues 
presented if not military lawyers?  Are courts-martial still needed to provide 
“ready-at-hand” justice? 
 
 More than two hundred years have passed since 1775, but much of the 
original military justice system remains the same.  Service members are still 
tried by court-martial.  Most of the original military offenses in the Articles of 
War approved by the Continental Congress remain offenses today.  The 
Armed Forces still use military lawyers called judge advocates to implement 
the military justice system.  Military proceedings are still mobile, with courts-
martial being held around the world wherever U.S. Armed Forces are located. 
 But there have been several important developments and improvements in 
military law.  The military law governing the Army, Navy, Marines, Coast 
Guard, and Air Force has been largely unified since 1950. This unification 
brought about a modern appellate system for review of court-martial deci-
sions.  Military judges have presided over general courts-martial and nearly 
all special courts-martial since 1969.  The rules of evidence applicable to 
courts-martial have been codified since 1984. 
 The aim of this casebook is to outline and explain the modern military jus-
tice system.  The first subject addressed is the basic sources of military law, 
which you will see throughout this text. 
The Constitution 
 The Constitution addresses military justice in several provisions.  Article I, 
§ 8, clause 14 gives Congress the power to “make Rules for the Government 
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”  Pursuant to this power, Con-
gress has established offenses that may be tried by court-martial and proce-
dures for conducting these trials. Two cases in this chapter consider the scope 
of this power in some depth. 
 In addition, Article II, § 2, clause 1 makes the President the “Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the 
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”  Pur-
suant to this provision the President has the power, even without a specific 
legislative grant of authority, to exercise all of the powers military command-
ers have traditionally enjoyed.  These powers include convening courts-mar-
tial for trying service members and military commissions for trying war 
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criminals.  See Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 558 (1897) (“[I]t is 
within the power of the president of the United States, as commander in 
chief, to validly convene a general court-martial” even in circumstances not 
authorized by Congress); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595 (2006) 
(recognizing a “general Presidential authority to convene military commis-
sions” even in the absence of Congressional authorization, in circumstances 
justified under the Constitution and law of war”). 
 The Constitution addresses the rights of the accused in a number of provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights.  An important question has been the extent to 
which the Bill of Rights protects service members.  The Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution expressly does not require a grand jury indictment “in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger.”  But the courts have held that most other pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights do apply to service members.  United States v. 
Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (C.M.A. 1960) (“the protections in the Bill of 
Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inappli-
cable, are available to the members of our armed forces”).  Further discussion 
of these matters appears in later chapters. 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice 
 Prior to 1950, military justice varied from service to service.  The Army 
and Navy, in particular, had separate laws, customs, and practices.  In 1950, 
however, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the pur-
pose of creating a single, comprehensive military justice system for all service 
members.  The UCMJ is divided into “articles” and codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 
to § 809. 
 Articles 77-134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934, closely resemble the original 
articles of war adopted by the Second Continental Congress.  They contain the 
so-called “punitive articles,” the provisions that define the various crimes that 
courts-martial may try.  For example, just as article VII from the 1775 Articles 
of War (quoted above) made it a crime to strike or disobey a superior officer, 
article 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890, now says: 
Any person subject to this chapter who— 
 (1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or draws or lifts up any 
weapon or offers any violence against him while he is in the execution of 
his office; or 
 (2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned 
officer; 
shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or 
such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the offense is 
committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a 
court-martial may direct. 
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Similarly, Articles 85 and 86, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885-886, like article VIII of 
the original Articles of War (quoted above), address the subjects of desertion 
and being absent without leave. 
 One can see in these and other provisions that most of the disciplinary 
problems facing the military two hundred years ago remain issues today.  But 
the UCMJ also contains new provisions aimed at modern forms of miscon-
duct, like drunk driving, see id. § 911, or wrongful drug use, see id. § 912a, 
that were not known in 1775.  We will consider the punitive articles in later 
chapters of this book. 
 Articles 30-76, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-876, address pre-trial, trial, post-
trial, and appellate procedures.  These sections, however, contain only the 
broad outlines of how the military justice system is to work.  The UCMJ 
leaves it to the President to specify the details by promulgating rules of evi-
dence and procedure.  Article 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836, one of the most im-
portant provisions in the UCMJ, says in part: 
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cas-
es arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commis-
sions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, 
may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he 
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence 
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States dis-
trict courts, but which may not, except as provided in chapter 47A of this 
title, be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter. 
Pursuant to this provision, the President has issued executive orders estab-
lishing the Rules for Court-Martial and the Military Rules of Evidence.  These 
rules appear in a very important government publication called the Manual 
for Courts-Martial, which is discussed below.  The President also has au-
thority under Article 56, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856, to establish the maximum 
limits for punishment for various offenses. 
 Other articles of the UCMJ address apprehension and restraint, 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 807-814, nonjudicial punishment, id. § 815, the composition of courts-
martial, id. §§ 822-29, and general and miscellaneous other matters, id. 
§§ 801-805, 835-841.  Article 146, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 946, creates a “Code 
Committee” consisting of the judges of the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, the senior military attorneys for each service, and two civilians.  Its 
purpose is to study the functioning of the military justice system and submit a 
report to Congress each year.  The reports contain useful statistics, which are 
cited in various places in this book. 
The Manual for Courts-Martial 
 The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) has been called the military law-
yer’s Bible.  It includes five Parts plus numerous appendices.  Part I is a short 
explanatory preamble.  Parts II and III contain the Rules of Court-Martial 
Procedure (RCM) and Military Rules of Evidence (MRE).  These rules resem-
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ble the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, and largely serve the same function.  Interspersed among these rules 
are helpful but non-binding “discussions” of the rules.  Court-martial proce-
dures are different in many ways from those in civilian courts, but the rules of 
evidence are largely the same.  Accordingly, once a trial by court-martial gets 
underway, it has much the same feel as a civilian criminal trial. 
 Part IV of the MCM contains what amounts to a guide to the UCMJ’s puni-
tive articles.  It quotes the text of each offense, identifies the elements of the 
offense, explains the offense, lists lesser included offenses, and provides sam-
ple specifications to be used for charging an accused service member.  Mili-
tary lawyers and judges rely very heavily on Part IV to determine exactly what 
the evidence must show for a court-martial to find someone guilty. 
  Part V concerns nonjudicial punishment, a subject that is addressed in 
Chapter 3 of this casebook.  The rest of the MCM contains various important 
appendices, including copies of the Constitution and UCMJ, a table of maxi-
mum penalties, and helpful analyses of the procedural and evidentiary rules. 
Service Regulations 
 Each service also has promulgated regulations that address various aspects 
of the military justice system.  Army Regulation 27-10, Military Justice, for 
example, states numerous policies concerning subjects such as the assign-
ment of defense counsel, military justice within the reserve components, and 
so forth.  Although these service regulations do not directly control the con-
duct of a court-martial trial, they do affect many important aspects of the 
military justice system.  We will see several examples in subsequent chapters. 
Reported Judicial Decisions 
 The Chart below illustrates the structure of the military justice court sys-
tem.  Courts-martials—the trial courts of the Armed Forces—prepare com-
plete records of trial, including a complete verbatim transcript of the entire 
proceeding from start to finish.  But courts-martial rarely issue published 
opinions.  Published opinions, however, are prepared by the three levels of 
appellate courts that may review the results of a court-martial. 
Secondary Sources 
 Many excellent secondary sources cover the military justice system.  Two  
publications are especially helpful.  The Military Judges’ Benchbook, Depart-
ment of Army Pamphlet 27-9,  is an instructional guide for the conduct of 
trials.  This book is available online at the U.S. Army Publishing Directorate 
<www.apd.army.mil>.  It contains model “scripts” for most parts of a court-
martial, panel instructions, and many other materials.  The best historical 
source is William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1896, 1920 
reprint), which courts often consult when deciding constitutional issues.  It is 
available at the Library of Congress’s website <www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Mili-
tary_Law/military-legal-resources-home.html>.
CH. 1 OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 
 
 
 
 As discussed more fully in subsequent chapters, an appeal from a court-
martial goes first to one of the four Service Courts of Criminal Appeals—the 
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, or the Navy-Marine Corps Court of 
Criminal Appeals.  All of the decisions they designate as publishable are in-
cluded in West’s Military Justice Reporter.  Military lawyers constantly look 
to and cite these decisions because they often answer issues arising under the 
UCMJ, the Rules for Court-Martial and Military Rules of Evidence. 
 Decisions of the Service Courts of Criminal Appeals are subject to discre-
tionary review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.  
Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (or C.A.A.F.) are also 
published in West’s Military Justice Reporter.  From the Court of Appeals for 
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the Armed Forces, litigants may petition the U.S. Supreme Court for review 
by writ of certiorari.  The Supreme Court’s decisions appear in the United 
States Reports. 
 The military judges and members of the courts-martial for all Services are 
uniformed service members.  The judges of the Air Force, Army, and Navy-
Marine Corps Courts of Criminal Appeals are JAG officers, but the Coast 
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals includes civilians.  The Supreme Court has 
upheld the constitutionality of this arrangement.  See Edmond v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
 One initially challenging aspect of researching military justice cases is that 
the names of the military courts have changed over time.  Prior to 1994, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces was called the Court of Military 
Appeals.  The Courts of Criminal Appeals for the various Services have un-
dergone two name changes.  Prior to 1994, they were called Courts of Military 
Review, and prior to 1968, they were called Boards of Review (i.e., the Army 
Board of Review became the Army Court of Military Review, and then later 
became the Army Court of Criminal Appeals).  Prior to 1951, there was no 
court equivalent to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and the precur-
sors to the Boards of Review were considerably different in structure and 
function. 
 
 The following case illustrates how parties and judges sometimes may dis-
pute what is and is not a binding source of military law. 
UNITED STATES v. LAZAUSKAS 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
62 M.J. 39 (C.A.A.F. 2005) 
Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 In March 2001, a confidential informant reported to the law enforcement 
officials at Lackland Air Force Base that Appellant was selling and using ec-
stasy.  After the controlled purchase of ecstasy by the confidential informer, 
follow-up inquiries led to the discovery of a number of witnesses who stated 
that Appellant [Stephen J. Lazauskas, Airman Basic, U.S. Air Force] used 
drugs in February, March, April, and May 2001, at various times both on and 
off the installation. 
 At his arraignment, Appellant made a motion to dismiss the charges 
against him based on a violation of his right to speedy trial under Rule for 
Courts–Martial (R.C.M.) 707, Article 10, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2000), and 
the Sixth Amendment.  The military judge denied his motion on all 
grounds. . . . [T]he military judge determined that the Government was ex-
cluded from accountability for a total of seventy-two days out of the 189–day 
delay and was therefore left accountable for a total delay of 117 days, which 
was within the R.C.M. 707 allowable limit of 120 days. . . . 
* * * 
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 [One] period of time in dispute is a six-day continuance allowed during an 
Article 32 hearing [from August 8-13].  The convening authority appointed an 
investigating officer for the Article 32 hearing, and in the Appointment Mem-
orandum stated the officer was “delegated the authority to grant any reasona-
bly requested delays of the Article 32 investigation.” . . . Two days prior to the 
date originally scheduled for the Article 32 hearing, the Government repre-
sentative provided the military defense counsel with a list of eight witnesses 
the Government expected to testify at the Article 32 hearing. . . . At the Article 
32 hearing, six of these witnesses testified; however, two witnesses were on 
leave. The defense then requested the witnesses and objected to taking their 
testimony over the telephone. Based on the defense objection, the Article 32 
investigating officer delayed the hearing until August 13, 2001, to procure 
their live testimony. . . . 
 * * * 
 . . . Under R.C.M. 707(c), all pretrial delays approved by the convening au-
thority are excludable so long as approving them was not an abuse of the con-
vening authority’s discretion. It does not matter which party is responsible. 
 The discussion pertaining to this rule provides: “Prior to referral, the con-
vening authority may delegate the authority to grant continuances to an Arti-
cle 32 investigating officer.” R.C.M. 707(a)(1) discussion. 
 Additionally, where, as here, the convening authority has delegated to an 
investigating officer the “authority to grant any reasonably requested delays 
of the Article 32 investigation,” then any delays approved by the Article 32 in-
vestigating officer also are excludable. 
 Thus, when an investigating officer has been delegated authority to grant 
delays, the period covered by the delay is excludable from the 120–day period 
under R.C.M. 707.  If the issue of speedy trial under R.C.M. 707 is raised be-
fore the military judge at trial, the issue is not which party is responsible for 
the delay but whether the decision of the officer granting the delay was an 
abuse of discretion. . . . 
 . . . R.C.M. 405(g)(1)(A) provides that the parties are entitled to the pres-
ence of witnesses who have relevant testimony and the evidence is “not cu-
mulative.”  However, R.C.M. 405(g)(4)(B) provides that the investigating of-
ficer may take sworn statements of unavailable witnesses over the telephone.  
The first period of time involved the delay to obtain the personal testimony of 
two witnesses who were on leave.  The investigating officer, under the au-
thority delegated to him by the convening authority, granted the delay. As to 
this period, the military judge found that: 
[A]t some point during the Article 32 hearing, the defense learned that 
several witnesses it believed the government would be calling live were ac-
tually going to be called telephonically. The defense objected to their being 
called telephonically and the Article 32 hearing was delayed so that the de-
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fense could question them when they were personally available which was 
on 13 August 2001. 
 We hold that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding 
this delay. 
 * * * 
GIERKE, Chief Judge (concurring in the result): 
 The discussion to R.C.M. 707(c)(1) states that “[p]rior to referral, the con-
vening authority may delegate the authority to grant continuances to an Arti-
cle 32 investigating officer.”  [Although the court relies on this statement, the] 
. . . discussion does not definitively resolve this issue for two reasons. First, 
the authority to grant a continuance is not necessarily the same as the au-
thority to exclude the resulting delay from Government accountability.  A ra-
tional military justice system could give the investigating officer the power to 
grant delays but reserve for other officials the power to exclude such delay 
from Government accountability. . . . 
 Second, the discussion accompanying the Rules for Courts–Martial, while 
in the Manual for Courts–Martial, United States (2002 ed.) (MCM), is not 
part of the presidentially-prescribed portion of the MCM. The MCM expressly 
states that it consists of its “Preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Mili-
tary Rules of Evidence, the Punitive Articles, and Nonjudicial Punishment 
Procedures.” Absent from this list are the discussion accompanying the Pre-
amble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and the Punitive Articles, as well as the 
MCM’s appendices, including the MCM’s drafters’ analysis. As Professor 
Gregory E. Maggs helpfully explains, “The President played no role in pre-
paring these supplementary materials, and he did not promulgate them by 
executive order; on the contrary, these materials represent only the beliefs of 
staff personnel who worked on the Manual.”5  So, as Professor Maggs con-
cludes, the courts “do not violate the principle of deference to the President 
when they disagree with them.”6 
 Nevertheless, I agree with the majority opinion that the time was properly 
excluded. . . . 
 * * * 
 . . . I would recognize that after charges have been referred, the Govern-
ment may seek a ruling from the military judge retroactively excluding pre-
referral delay from Government accountability. To rule otherwise would ele-
vate form over substance.  If the time should be excluded from Government 
accountability, a different result should not arise merely because a specific 
official did not bless the delay when it occurred. And allowing a military judge 
to retroactively exclude pre-referral delay from Government accountability is 
                                                          
5 Gregory E. Maggs, Judicial Review of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 160 Mil. L. 
Rev. 96, 115 (1999). 
6 Id. 
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consistent with R.C.M. 707(c) because the pretrial delay would be “approved 
by a military judge.” 
 In this case, the military judge’s ruling approved the pretrial delay.  That 
ruling was neither unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the 
time was properly excluded from Government accountability. 
 * * * 
Points for Discussion 
 1. How many different sources of military law are cited in this short opin-
ion? 
 2.  Is the majority opinion’s reliance on the “discussion” of RCM 707, 
which is included in the MCM improper if the discussion is not binding as 
Judge Gierke says? 
1-2. Overview of the System from Start to End 
 With this background, consider now how the modern military justice sys-
tem might handle a violation of the UCMJ.  The “Court-Martial Process” chart 
(on the following page) shows the many steps in the process from start to fin-
ish.  Perhaps the best way to understand this chart is by considering a hy-
pothetical. 
 The following imaginary facts draw in part upon sample forms in an ap-
pendix to the MCM:  Suppose that at 0630 on 15 July 2007, Company A of 
the 61st Infantry Brigade, garrisoned at Fort Blank in Missouri, called roll.  
All were present or accounted for except Private First Class (PFC) Reuben J. 
James, who was absent without leave.  PFC James’s squad leader immedi-
ately asked other members of the squad if they knew where he was.  No one 
knew, but one soldier said, “I bet PFC James is off post buying drugs.”  When 
the sergeant asked why he thought so, the soldier replied:  “Three days ago, 
PFC James showed me 10 grams of marijuana that he had bought.  I imagine 
he is out looking for some more.” 
 The squad leader informed the platoon sergeant and platoon leader, who 
told the company commander, Captain (CPT) Jonathan E. Richards.  Rich-
ards relayed the information to the Military Police, who immediately began 
looking for PFC James.  They apprehended him a few hours later as he tried 
to reenter Fort Blank through the main gate.  When the MPs searched his 
person, they found 10 grams of vegetable matter which a screening test sub-
sequently determined to be marijuana.  The processes of the military justice 
system had begun. 
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  Following the Court-Martial Process Chart, you can see that once PFC 
James has been apprehended, CPT Richards had a few important decisions to 
make.  The first decision was whether to impose “pretrial restraint.”  Under 
RCM 304, pretrial restraint “may consist of conditions on liberty, restriction in 
lieu of arrest, arrest, or confinement.”  After consulting with a military attor-
ney, CPT Richards decided to order PFC James not to leave the confines of the 
post, a typical restriction imposed on soldiers who have gone absent without 
leave for a brief time. 
 As PFC James’s immediate commander, CPT Richards also had to decide 
how to dispose of the apparent AWOL and marijuana offenses.  Military 
commanders have considerable discretion in such questions because upon 
them falls the responsibility of deciding what is necessary for discipline with-
in their units.  According to RCM 306, Captain Richards had several options.  
One option would have been to take no action.  That choice might be appro-
priate for a trivial or technical violation of the UCMJ, or where the 
commander feels the evidence is too lacking to proceed.  But CPT Richards 
felt that drug use leading a soldier to miss duty required a more forceful re-
sponse. 
 A second option under RCM 306 would have been to address the miscon-
duct with “administrative corrective measures,” such as counseling, admoni-
tions, reprimands, exhortations, disapprovals, criticisms, censures, re-
proaches, rebukes, or extra military instruction.  While more than nothing, 
CPT Richards decided that administrative corrective measures were still not 
enough of a response to the alleged misconduct. 
 A third option would have been to address the misconduct with “nonjudi-
cial punishment.” Also as described in Chapter 3, Article 15, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 815, empowers the commander to impose minor punishments on soldiers 
for violations of the UCMJ, without trying them by court-martial unless the 
accused insists on a court-martial.  While offenses disposed of under Article 
15 are “criminal” offenses, their level of disposition does not result in a crimi-
nal conviction, and the permissible punishments are limited.  For example, 
CPT Richards might have ordered a forfeiture of pay or a period of additional 
duty as a punishment for the misconduct.  But again, CPT Richards thought 
the apparent offenses called for something more. 
 Accordingly, CPT Richards chose a fourth option, namely, “preferring” 
charges against PFC James so that he could be tried by a court-martial.  Un-
der RCM 307, a person prefers charges by putting them in writing, stating 
that he or she has personal knowledge of or has investigated the matters set 
forth in the charges and specifications, and by signing them under oath.  The 
following sample form from the MCM, called a “Charge Sheet,” illustrates 
CPT Richards’s action in this hypothetical story. 
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 Box 10 of the Charge Sheet shows that CPT Richards formally accused PFC 
Williams of one specification of being absent without leave in violation of Ar-
ticle 86, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 886, and one specification of possessing mariju-
ana in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 912a.  In box 11, CPT Rich-
ards signed the charges under oath.  The reverse side of the form shows what 
happened next. 
   As indicated in box 12, CPT Richards informed PFC Williams of the 
charges against him.  Box 13 shows that the form was forwarded to CPT Will 
M. Wilson, an officer who was designated as the “Summary Court-Martial 
Convening Authority” for the 1st Battalion of the 61st Infantry Brigade. 
 As shown on the Court-Martial Process Chart, CPT Wilson, like CPT Rich-
ards, also had several choices.  Under RCM 403, he could dismiss the charges 
or forward the charges to a subordinate or superior commander for disposi-
tion.  Alternatively, he could refer the charges to a “summary court-martial.” 
  As discussed at considerable length later in this book, there are three types 
of courts-martial: a summary court-martial, a special court-martial, or a gen-
eral court-martial.  See R.C.M. 201(f).  These three types of courts-martial 
differ in the formality of their procedures and the range of penalties that they 
may impose. 
 A summary court-martial is a very informal proceeding that takes place 
without a military judge or a prosecutor.  Instead, a junior officer typically 
serves alone and hears the evidence.  Findings of guilt are not considered 
criminal convictions.  The sentences that can be imposed are modest, and 
vary according to the rank of the accused.  Chapter 3 considers summary 
courts-martial in more depth. 
 A special court-martial is an adversary criminal trial, almost always pre-
sided over by a military judge, with both the government and the accused 
represented by counsel.  Witnesses testify according to regular rules of evi-
dence, and the trial follows very formal procedural rules—much like any state 
or federal criminal trial.  The maximum penalties that a special court-martial 
may impose are a bad-conduct discharge, one year of confinement, and for-
feiture of two-thirds pay and benefits for one year.1  A rough analogy in civil-
ian practice is that a special court-martial is typically used for misdemean-
ors.2 
                                                          
1 Article 19, UCMJ, does not require pre-trial advice from the staff judge advocate 
prior to the convening of a special court-martial empowered to impose a bad-conduct 
discharge.  Under stricter Army Regulations, however, an Army Special Court-Martial 
Convening Authority has the power to convene a special court-martial with the power 
to adjudge a bad-conduct discharge only if he receives pretrial advice from the staff 
judge advocate.   
2 The following table illustrates approximate analogues among the Federal, State, and 
military court systems: 
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 A general court-martial, like a special court-martial, is also an adversary 
criminal trial conducted according to formal evidentiary and procedural 
rules.  One major difference is that a general court-martial is typically used 
for more serious crimes.  A general court-martial can impose any lawful sen-
tence authorized for the offense of which the accused is convicted, including 
life imprisonment or even death for serious crimes.  
 In this case, box 14 of the Charge Sheet indicates that CPT Wilson did not 
refer the charges to a summary court-martial, but instead forwarded them to 
Colonel (COL) Carl E. Nevin, an officer designated as the Special Courts-
Martial Convening Authority.  Under RCM 404, COL Nevin also had several 
choices.  He could take no action and dismiss the charges.  He could employ 
administrative corrective measures or possibly nonjudicial punishment to 
address the situation.  He could return the charges to CPT James.  He could 
convene a special court-martial.  He could order a “pretrial investigation” for 
the purpose of securing more information about the best disposition of the 
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charges.  (Unless waived, a pre-trial investigation is necessary before referral 
of charges to a general court-martial.)  Finally, COL Nevin could forward the 
charges to the officer designated as the General Courts-Martial Convening 
Authority, who might be a Major General or Lieutenant General commanding 
the division at Fort Blank or the corps of which the division is a part. 
 The reverse side of the Charge Sheet shows that COL Nevin chose to refer 
the case to a Special Court-Martial.  Accordingly, there was no pre-trial in-
vestigation and the case was not referred to the general court-martial con-
vening authority. 
 When PFC Wilson is tried by a special court-martial,  the trial will resem-
ble a civilian criminal trial in most respects.  As the Court-Martial Process 
Chart indicates, under RCMs 901-1011, there will be an arraignment, and un-
less he pleads guilty, a trial on the merits in which rules of evidence are used, 
followed by a finding of guilty or not guilty.  If he is found guilty, each side 
will produce evidence relevant to sentencing, and a decision on the sentence 
will follow.  PFC James can request a trial either by a judge or a panel.  The 
panel, however, is not exactly like a civilian jury.  Its members will consist of 
officers or enlisted members chosen by the convening authority to hear the 
case.  PFC James may request that the panel include at least one-third en-
listed members.  And unlike a civilian jury, the panel’s finding does not have 
to be unanimous.  It could find him guilty by a two-thirds vote. 
 If the special court-martial finds PFC James guilty, he will have two 
chances for review of his conviction.  First, the results of the trial will be for-
warded to COL Nevin.  Under RCMs 1105 and 1106, PFC James will have the 
opportunity to submit documents and arguments to COL Nevin.  COL Nevin 
will have the power to approve the findings or dismiss them, or to approve 
the sentence, mitigate the sentence, or disapprove the sentence.  He can base 
a decision not to approve the findings or sentence as adjudged either on 
grounds that errors occurred at the trial or that PFC Wilson deserves clem-
ency. 
 If PFC Wilson is sentenced to one year of confinement or given a punitive 
discharge, he will also have a right to have his case reviewed by the Army 
Court of Criminal Appeals.  See RCM 1201(a)(2).  He then may seek discre-
tionary review by the U.S. Court of Appeals and then review by the Supreme 
Court.  See RCM 1204.  If he receives a lesser sentence, he may still seek re-
view by the Judge Advocate General.  See RCM 1201(b). 
 
Points for Discussion 
 1.  Is the military justice system necessary or could civilian courts handle 
the trials of service members accused of committing crimes?  The answer 
perhaps depends on how frequently the military justice system is invoked.  
This figure varies over time, depending on what the military is doing and how 
many service members are on duty.  During World War II, there were 1.7 mil-
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lion courts-martial in the Armed Forces, the equivalent of one-third of all the 
civilian criminal cases tried in the United States during the War.  See The 
Army Lawyer: A History of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 1775-1975 
192 (1975).  Most of the World War II-era courts-martial, however, were sum-
mary courts-martial, as commanders at the time could not impose 
punishment for minor offenses as is now permitted using Article 15, UCMJ.  
In recent years, with an all-volunteer force, the number of courts-martial has 
declined substantially.  To look at just one service, in fiscal year 2010, there 
were 566,045 soldiers on active duty in the Army.  Of these soldiers, 610 were 
tried by general court-martial, 454 by special court-martial, and 819 by sum-
mary court-martial.  In addition, 36,624 received nonjudicial punishment.  
See Uniform Code of Military Justice Committee, Annual Report for the pe-
riod October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010, http://www.armfor.
U.S.C.ourts.gov/newcaaf/annual/FY10AnnualReport.pdf. Although the num-
ber of prosecutions has declined, what might still be some of the practical 
difficulties of turning all of these matters over to civilian courts? 
 2.  Who provides legal advice to commanders and the accused as cases 
proceed through the military justice system?  Could civilian lawyers operate 
as effectively as military lawyers in this role? 
 
 The following two cases are included for different reasons.  The first one 
illustrates how cases sometimes encounter difficulties as they move through 
the complex path of military justice.  The second case illustrates the serious-
ness of some of the cases that the military justice system must address. 
UNITED STATES v. TITTEL 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
53 M.J. 313 (C.A.A.F. 2000) 
Senior Judge COX delivered opinion of the Court. 
 Prior to the case at hand, in June of 1996, a general court-martial con-
victed appellant [Specialist Third Class Todd A. Tittel, U.S. Navy] of a number 
of charges, one of which was shoplifting from the Navy Exchange in Sasebo, 
Japan.  He was sentenced to be confined for 90 days and reduced to paygrade 
E–4.  In September of 1996, appellant was processed at an administrative 
separation board because of his earlier court-martial conviction; the board 
recommended a General Discharge. 
 The case at hand begins in October of 1996, one day before the execution 
date of appellant’s discharge, when he was caught shoplifting from the Navy 
Exchange, Yokosuka, Japan. While being filmed by a video surveillance cam-
era, appellant stole 44 items with the total value of about $366.33. After this 
incident, Captain William D. Lynch, Commanding Officer Fleet Activities, 
Yokosuka, Japan, ordered appellant not to enter any Navy Exchange facility.  
Appellant disobeyed that order by entering a Navy Exchange. 
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 Appellant was apprehended and charged with several offenses. He was 
tried by a special court-martial, and pursuant to his pleas was convicted of 
willful disobedience of a superior officer, Captain Lynch, in violation of Arti-
cle 90, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890 and larceny, in vio-
lation of Article 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 921. The court-martial sentenced ap-
pellant to be confined for 103 days, to forfeit $578 pay per month for 1 month, 
to be reduced to the paygrade of E–1, and to be discharged from the Navy 
with a bad-conduct discharge.  The convening authority, also Captain Lynch, 
approved the sentence. 
 In an unpublished opinion the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
conviction. However, the Court reduced the sentenced confinement period 
from 103 days to 73 in order to comply with the pretrial agreement. 
 We granted review of the following issue: 
WHETHER THE NAVY–MARINE CORPS COURT OF CRIMINAL AP-
PEALS ERRED BY AFFIRMING APPELLANT’S CONVICTION, WHERE 
THE CONVENING AUTHORITY WAS AN ACCUSER AND THUS COULD 
NOT CONVENE APPELLANT’S COURT–MARTIAL. 
 For the first time on appeal, appellant seeks relief.  Appellant contends 
that where an officer’s order is willfully disobeyed, the officer is the victim of 
that crime.  As such, the officer has a personal interest in the disposition of 
the offense and becomes an “accuser.” An “accuser” is disqualified from con-
vening a special court-martial. RCM 504(c)(1), Manual for Courts–Martial, 
United States (1955 ed.). 
 Appellant’s argument is facially appealing. Convening authorities must be 
neutral.  His rationale is that where an officer is the victim of willful disobedi-
ence, he cannot be neutral. Therefore, he cannot be the convening authority 
for that same case of willful disobedience. 
 When addressing the question, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated the 
following: 
 [T]he appellant contends that the convening authority was an accuser 
and prohibited from convening his court-martial. Based on the record be-
fore us, we find no evidence that Captain Lynch became personally in-
volved with the appellant to the extent that he became an accuser.  As-
suming arguendo that he did become an accuser, which we do not, his fail-
ure to forward the charges to the next higher level of command for dispo-
sition was a nonjurisdictional error, which was waived by the appellant’s 
failure to raise it at his court-martial. RULE FOR COURTS–MARTIAL 
904(e), MANUAL FOR COURTS–MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1998 
ed.); [United States v.] Shiner, 40 M.J. [155, 157 (C.M.A. 1994) ]. We find 
no plain error. See United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327, 328 (C.M.A. 
1986); United States v. Powell, [49 M.J. 460 (1998)]. In light of the seri-
ous nature of the charges facing the appellant, we find it unlikely that any 
competent authority would not have referred this case to a special court-
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martial. Consequently, we find no fair risk that the appellant was preju-
diced by the error.  See Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a). 
 Having reviewed the record, we agree with the analysis of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we find that the Navy–Marine Corps Court of 
Criminal Appeals did not err by affirming appellant’s conviction. 
 The decision of the United States Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal 
Appeals is affirmed. 
EFFRON, Judge, with whom SULLIVAN, Judge, joins (concurring in part and 
in the result): 
 I agree with the majority opinion, except to the extent that it may be read 
to suggest that this case provides an appropriate vehicle for deciding whether 
the status of a convening authority as an accuser can be passively waived, as 
opposed to being the subject of a knowing and intelligent waiver.  I note that 
the decision in this case is not based upon waiver, but rests instead upon the 
conclusion that the convening authority was not an accuser.  The majority 
opinion appropriately endorses the holding of the lower court that “[b]ased 
on the record before us, we find no evidence that Captain Lynch became per-
sonally involved with the appellant to the extent that he became an accuser.” 
 A personal order does not necessarily implicate a commander’s personal 
interest such that he becomes an “accuser” and is disqualified as a convening 
authority.  See United States v. Voorhees, 50 M.J. 494 (1999). The order that 
appellant disobeyed was a routine, administrative type of order that virtually 
automatically flowed from the fact of appellant’s arrest for shoplifting. No 
reasonable person would conclude that it represented any personal, versus 
official, interest of Captain Lynch or that its violation was an act that a com-
mander would take personally. See Art. 1(9) and 23(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 801(9) and 823(b), respectively; United States v. Gordon, 1 U.S.C.MA 255, 
261, 2 CMR 161, 167(1952).  Under these circumstances, the issue of waiver 
does not arise because the record does not support appellant’s contention 
that the convening authority had become an accuser. 
Points for Discussion 
 1. How would you trace the path of this case on the Court-Martial Process 
chart included on page 12? 
 2.  In how many ways did the Navy respond to  Tittel’s various acts of mis-
conduct?  Which officers and courts reviewed the finding of guilt and the 
sentence in this case? 
 3. Why shouldn’t the convening authority—the officer who convenes the 
court-martial—be a person who has an interest in any of the charges?  Is it ap-
propriate to describe Captain Lynch, the officer who convened the court-
martial, as the victim of one of the crimes? 
 
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UNITED STATES v. SCHAP 
Army Court of Criminal Appeals 
44 M.J. 512 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1996) 
JOHNSTON, Judge: 
 Contrary to his plea, the appellant [Stephen J. Schap, Sergeant, U.S. Army] 
was found guilty by a general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted 
members of premeditated murder in violation of Article 118, Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1988) [hereinafter UCMJ]. Although the 
appellant was sentenced by the members to a dishonorable discharge, con-
finement for life, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to Private 
E1, they recommended that the confinement be reduced as a matter of clem-
ency. The convening authority approved only so much of the sentence as pro-
vided for a dishonorable discharge, confinement for forty-five years, forfei-
ture of all pay and allowances and reduction to Private E1. 
 The appellant contends, inter alia, that the evidence is legally and factually 
insufficient to support a conviction for any offense greater than voluntary 
manslaughter, that the military judge made numerous errors in regard to in-
structions to the members, and that the military judge abused his discretion 
in improperly limiting the testimony of a defense expert and in admitting evi-
dence that was unduly prejudicial. We disagree and affirm. 
Facts 
 This case involves a sordid tale of infidelity and murder by decapitation. 
 The appellant and his wife were married in 1989 after a six-month court-
ship. The appellant took his marriage seriously and wanted it to be a perma-
nent commitment. Because his wife had suffered through three miscarriages 
during the marriage, the appellant obtained a vasectomy to preclude further 
suffering on her part. 
 By December 1991, the wife felt that her feelings for her husband “had 
pretty much died” and she decided that she could not continue with the mar-
riage.  Nevertheless, in December, 1992, she followed her husband to Fulda, 
Germany, where he was assigned after joining the Army in January, 1992.  
During 1993, she took advantage of the assignment to Germany and often 
traveled throughout Europe without him. 
 The appellant and the victim, Specialist (SPC) Glover, became friends in 
early 1993. On two or three occasions, SPC Glover visited the appellant and 
his wife in their quarters. In the summer of 1993, the appellant was required 
to attend a military leadership training course. While the appellant was away 
from home, SPC Glover went to the appellant’s quarters at least six times and 
had sexual intercourse with the appellant’s wife. The appellant wrote love let-
ters to his wife while attending the course. Although by her own account she 
no longer loved the appellant at the time and she was having an affair with 
SPC Glover, she responded with equally passionate correspondence. 
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 By October, 1993, the appellant’s wife learned that she was pregnant as a 
result of her sexual liaisons with SPC Glover. She did not tell the appellant 
about the pregnancy. She and her husband stopped having sexual relations 
that same month. In mid-November, 1993, she told the appellant that she no 
longer loved him and wanted a divorce. Over the Thanksgiving weekend, the 
couple talked about the details of a separation and divorce. Ultimately they 
agreed to a separation and her early return to the United States. 
 Although the appellant’s wife assured him that there was no other man in 
her life, the appellant was suspicious. He intercepted a letter to her post-
marked 29 November 1993, that suggested that she was pregnant. On 5 De-
cember 1993, the appellant found his wife’s secret diary that indicated she 
may have had many other lovers during their marriage. When the appellant 
confronted her, she tried to explain the journal entries as fantasies or inno-
cent relationships. On 6 December 1993, they met with a chaplain as a prel-
ude to the pending separation, and both claimed to have been faithful during 
the marriage. 
 On 7 December 1993, the appellant went to work as normal while his wife 
intended to go to the bank. On the way, she experienced very heavy vaginal 
bleeding. Because she was afraid she was having another miscarriage, she 
asked an acquaintance to take her to the local German hospital. After she ar-
rived at the hospital, she was told she would be there for at least a week. She 
attempted to contact SPC Glover through a legal clerk at the legal assistance 
office where she had worked as a volunteer. Later in the morning, when the 
appellant coincidentally stopped by the legal assistance office to obtain some 
papers in connection with the pending marital separation, that same legal 
clerk told the appellant that his wife was in the hospital. The appellant was 
concerned and went to the hospital at approximately 1420 while dressed in 
his battle dress uniform. 
 When the appellant arrived at the hospital, his wife informed him that she 
was pregnant because of an extramarital affair with a person she did not iden-
tify. He remained calm and appeared to be concerned about her condition. 
The appellant left the hospital around 1500 and returned to his quarters to 
retrieve items his wife had requested for her stay at the hospital. When he had 
not returned by 1530, she called the quarters twice, but received no answer. 
 The appellant arrived back at the hospital at approximately 1610 wearing 
jeans and a jeans jacket. He appeared agitated and questioned his wife about 
the identity of her lover and the circumstances of the relationship. She told 
him that the child was conceived while she made love on a quilt in the appel-
lant’s living room. The appellant and his wife agreed that the lover should 
come to the hospital where she was undergoing treatment for the possible 
miscarriage. She also informed him that she had made arrangements for a 
message to be delivered to her lover so he could come to her side. While the 
appellant was in the room with her, she called the legal clerk to see if the mes-
sage had been delivered. Although the appellant did not learn of SPC Glover’s 
identity at that time, he learned that the lover held the rank of specialist. 
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 Approximately ten minutes later, the appellant called the legal clerk and 
asked, “did you deliver the message to the specialist?” The legal clerk said he 
was going to do so, but did not reveal the identity of the intended recipient. 
He then asked the appellant if he knew where a particular barracks was lo-
cated. 
 The appellant immediately drove to the location of the barracks, ap-
proached the staff duty noncommissioned officer (NCO), and explained that 
he needed to find the legal clerk who was looking for a room and that he also 
needed to find that same room. When the staff duty NCO asked the appellant 
which soldier he was looking for, the appellant said, “forget it” and departed. 
At approximately the same time, the legal clerk found the correct room and 
placed a message under SPC Glover’s door. He also had SPC Glover paged to 
ensure that he was notified that the appellant’s wife wanted him to join her at 
the hospital. 
 The appellant, who by this time was aware that SPC Glover was the para-
mour, began looking for him. At some point the appellant had obtained a 
fighting knife with an eight-inch double-edged blade that he brought with 
him in his car. The appellant, acting normal, asked a soldier near the barracks 
dining facility if he had seen SPC Glover. The soldier informed the appellant 
that SPC Glover was in the telephone booth adjacent to the dining facility. 
The appellant replied, “[w]ell, I guess he got the message.” 
 Specialist Glover had answered the page and had spoken with the legal 
clerk. He also had retrieved the message from under his door. At approxi-
mately 1715 he called the appellant’s wife at the hospital. While SPC Glover 
was talking on the telephone with the appellant’s wife, the appellant ap-
proached the telephone booth. Without confronting SPC Glover or giving him 
any chance to explain what had happened, the appellant stabbed and slashed 
his intended victim in the back of the neck. Specialist Glover attempted to flee 
but slipped to the ground. The appellant pursued, ran past his fallen victim, 
turned and knelt over him and stabbed and cut him ten to twenty times in the 
throat, practically severing his head. A witness described some of the motions 
involved in the attack as if the appellant was “cutting meat or skinning a 
deer.” Another witness described it as “slow” and “rhythmic,” “sort of like a 
sawing motion.” 
 After stabbing the victim, the appellant stood up and kicked SPC Glover in 
the head several times. The head separated from the body and rolled several 
feet away. The onlookers were stunned at the severity of the attack and sick-
ened with the results.  One soldier, who observed the attack, vomited at the 
sight.  The appellant, on the other hand, walked over to the head, picked it up 
by the hair, held it aloft and announced in a loud clear voice, “[t]his is what 
happens when you commit adultery.” He also stated in a sarcastic tone, 
“[a]nd he said he was sorry.”  The appellant then turned and walked at a brisk 
pace to his car, carrying the head under his arm “like a football.” 
CH. 1 OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 25 
 
 
 A short time later the appellant was observed near his car that was stopped 
on a bridge over a stream. When another car approached, he quickly departed 
from the area. The appellant continued on his way and parked several hun-
dred yards from the hospital. He removed his blood-stained jacket and shirt, 
put on an olive-colored jacket, and entered the hospital while carrying an ath-
letic bag. He entered his wife’s small hospital room and removed SPC Glover’s 
head from the athletic bag. He appeared agitated and very upset. He held the 
head in both hands and thrust it toward his wife’s face and chest. She 
screamed and cowered while the appellant set the head facing his wife on an 
adjacent night stand. He sat down on the bed and said, “Glover’s here, he’ll 
sleep with you every night now, only you won’t sleep, because all you’ll see is 
this.” 
 As startled medical personnel rushed to the room, the appellant remained 
seated on the bed, with his legs extended over his wife’s legs, his hand on her 
chest trying to make her look at the head. He said to the German doctors 
“[g]ood, you stay here, and listen to everything that I have to say, remember 
as much as you can.” He also stated, “I’m her husband, and she’s an adulter-
ess, not just with that man, . . . but many times over.” His wife described his 
statements as follows: 
He turned to me, he said, “you know,” he said, “you gave me enough clues. 
It was easy enough to figure out who it was.  It was easy enough to do this.” 
And he told the doctors, “I’m not normally a violent man.  This is my only 
violent act, but don’t underestimate me, I’m very skilled at what I do. I 
studied this, I planned this, I calculated this.”  And he turned to me and he 
said, “I did this for you, because I love you.” 
 When she asked him what he did with the body and the knife the appellant 
replied: 
I’m not that stupid . . . . I don’t care if they put me in jail for the rest of my 
life, because I’ll just think about you.  And I don’t care if they put me to 
sleep, if they kill me, because I’ll just think about you while they do it. 
 One of the German doctors testified that the appellant “behaved in a calm 
way” in the midst of the extraordinary situation at the hospital. The appellant 
asked for a bucket of water to wash his hands. He told the doctor that he “felt 
mistreated, humiliated, cheated on.” He took off his identification tags and 
threw them at the German police who arrived on the scene and said, 
“[t]here’s my name, I’m Stephen Schap.” He also said they should stay and 
listen to everything he had to say and be witnesses, but he’d go peacefully on-
ly when the military police arrived. Ultimately, the German police on the 
scene dragged the appellant from the room. 
 Shortly after he was apprehended, the appellant stated that his wife 
“shouldn’t have done what she’d done,” and that he “shouldn’t have done 
what he’d done either,” but he “realized what he did” and he would just have 
to “pay for it.” He was described by one witness as being “mighty calm about 
it.” The witness testified that the appellant “didn’t appear upset at all.” 
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 The appellant’s car was located several hundred yards from the hospital. 
The gas tank was full. Inside, authorities found a change of clothing, food, 
shaving items, closed-out bank account records, appellant’s passport, small 
amounts of six types of foreign currency, telephone records, diplomas, and 
tax records. Although prior to the incident, the appellant had received per-
mission to travel to the Netherlands for the weekend of 11–13 December 1993, 
some of the items found in the car normally were stored in boxes at the ap-
pellant’s quarters. 
 At his court-martial the appellant, who did not testify on the merits, never 
contested the fact that he had brutally attacked SPC Glover and taken the sev-
ered head to the hospital.  His entire defense was that he acted in the sudden 
heat of passion in committing the crime of voluntary manslaughter. 
Assigned Errors 
 The appellant contends, inter alia, that the evidence at trial was legally 
and factually insufficient to sustain any offense other than voluntary man-
slaughter.  Although the law recognizes that a “person may be provoked to 
such an extent” that “a fatal blow may be struck before self-control has re-
turned,” there are very specific requirements for a finding of voluntary man-
slaughter.  See Manual for Courts–Martial (1995 Edition) [hereinafter MCM], 
Part IV, para. 44c(1)(a); see also United States v. Maxie, 25 C.M.R. 418 
(C.M.A. 1958). . . . 
 In order for an unlawful killing to be reduced from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter the homicide must be committed in the “heat of sudden pas-
sion” which is “caused by adequate provocation.” MCM, Part IV, para. 
44c(1)(a). For the provocation to be “adequate,” however, the provocation 
must be of a nature to “excite uncontrollable passion in a reasonable person, 
and the act of killing must be committed under and because of the passion.” 
Id. Although the “passion may result from fear or rage,” the provocation can 
not be “sought or induced” by the killer. Id. Furthermore, “[i]f, judged by the 
standard of a reasonable person, sufficient cooling time elapses between the 
provocation and the killing, the offense is murder, even if the accused’s pas-
sion persists.” Id. 
 The test for legal sufficiency is whether, considering the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable fact finder could have 
found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); accord United States v. Turner, 25 
M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987). We are satisfied that the evidence of record more 
than meets this standard as to premeditated murder. 
 The test for factual sufficiency is whether, after weighing the evidence in 
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed 
the witnesses, we are convinced of the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Turner, 25 M.J. at 325. In applying this test, we make the following 
findings. 
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 First, we find that upon his wife’s verification of his suspicions that she 
was unfaithful, the appellant set about to identify and track down the para-
mour. This was to be accomplished through his questioning of his wife, his 
contact with the legal clerk who was to deliver the message to the paramour, 
and his questions to the staff duty NCO. 
 Next, and most importantly, we find that the appellant intended to murder 
his wife’s paramour, regardless of who it was. He planned to accomplish this 
objective by using the large fighting knife he brought along for that very pur-
pose. We reject the suggestion that the appellant only intended to confront 
the paramour and brought along the knife in case matters became unman-
ageable. 
 We also find that the nature and severity of the attack, coupled with the 
appellant’s vigorously kicking SPC Glover’s head, led to the head being sev-
ered from the body. Once the head was severed the appellant picked it up and 
made his coldly calculated comment about the deadly price of adultery. 
 We further find that the appellant carefully prepared for his escape and 
intended to flee from the scene of the crime. Once he held the severed head 
aloft, however, he realized that his identity would become known. Conse-
quently, he determined to inflict the maximum emotional suffering upon his 
wife before he was apprehended. All of his conduct prior to the attack, along 
with his comments at the scene, at the hospital to his wife and the doctors, 
and to the police, convinces us that the murder was a premeditated act rather 
than a crime committed in the heat of passion. 
 In order to prevail on his contention that his crime was voluntary man-
slaughter, we would have to be persuaded that the evidence presented by the 
government was insufficient to prove premeditated murder or unpremedi-
tated murder. We find, however, that the murder was consummated in a cold 
and calculating manner. We further find that the appellant had not lost self-
control at the time he killed SPC Glover. We specifically reject the defense 
contention that the learning of the paramour’s identity triggered an uncon-
trollable rage. The evidence shows that the intent to kill was present before 
the identity of the paramour was known. 
 We also specifically find the appellant did not kill SPC Glover while under 
the influence of uncontrolled passion and because of that passion. Our con-
clusion is that once the appellant learned of the lover’s identity, he specifically 
intended to kill SPC Glover, that he contemplated and planned SPC Glover’s 
murder, and that he had adequate “cooling off” time to reflect upon the con-
sequences before he acted. 
 We have carefully evaluated the entire record of trial, and conclude, apply-
ing our fact-finding powers of Article 66, UCMJ, that the appellant methodi-
cally planned the murder. In short, this was a premeditated murder in viola-
tion of Article 118(1), UCMJ, rather than voluntary manslaughter under 
Article 119, UCMJ. 
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 The appellant has assigned three errors in regard to instructions or lack 
thereof from the military judge.  In this case the military judge gave the 
standard instructions for premeditated murder, unpremeditated murder, and 
voluntary manslaughter. See Dep’t of the Army, Pam. 27–9, Military Judges’ 
Benchbook, para 3–86; 3–87. At various points in the instructions he cor-
rectly discussed heat of passion. At no time did the defense object to or re-
quest additional instructions. The trial defense counsel’s failure to object to 
an instruction or omission of an instruction constitutes waiver of the objec-
tion in the absence of plain error. Rule for Courts–Martial 920(f). See United 
States v. Morgan, 37 M.J. 407 (C.M.A. 1993); see also United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725 (1993). We are satisfied that the instructional errors, if any, did 
not rise to the level of plain error. The instructions, when taken as a whole, 
were appropriate and complete. We hold that the assignments of error con-
cerning the military judge’s instructions or lack of instructions are without 
merit. 
 * * * 
 The appellant next contends that the military judge abused his discretion 
in limiting the testimony of the defense expert about rage and premeditation.  
The military judge permitted the defense expert to testify over government 
objection. The expert’s testimony was directed at states of mind in general. 
The military judge permitted the witness to testify about how long an individ-
ual could remain in a state of rage. He also correctly allowed the expert to dis-
cuss a person’s ability to reflect on their actions. The military judge properly 
limited the expert discussion to prevent confusion between the concept of re-
flection and the legal standard of premeditation. Thus, the assigned error is 
without merit. 
 The appellant also contends that the military judge abused his discretion 
in refusing to allow the defense psychiatrist to testify that at the time of the 
offense the appellant was in a rage.  To the contrary, the military judge al-
lowed the expert to testify about these matters. He properly would not allow 
the expert to bring before the members those comments made by the appel-
lant during his clinical interviews. The expert was allowed to testify about the 
basis of his conclusions, but he was not allowed to place the appellant’s ver-
sion of events before the members without the benefit of cross-examination 
of the appellant himself. The assigned error is without merit. 
 The appellant further contends that the military judge abused his discre-
tion in admitting several books and catalogs concerning knives into evidence.  
Apparently government investigators searched through the appellant’s book-
shelves in an effort to find any link to the use of knives as weapons. This issue 
was fully litigated at an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session prior to trial on the mer-
its. Government counsel offered the books on the theory that they provided 
corroboration of the appellant’s admissions or confession. See Military Rule 
of Evidence. 304(g). The trial defense counsel contended that the books 
would be taken out of context and would prove to be more prejudicial than 
probative. In his view, it would not be unusual or probative of anything to 
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find that a soldier in the United States Army possessed books or catalogs that 
had pictures or articles about knives and self-defense. The military judge 
made specific findings that the items were probative and that no unfair prej-
udice would result to the appellant if the books were admitted into evidence. 
In addition, he offered the trial defense counsel the opportunity to put the 
books into their proper context by use of testimony and photographs. The de-
fense presented evidence, and directed its cross-examination to highlight that 
the appellant merely possessed the books and that the government presented 
no proof that he relied upon them in executing his alleged crime. 
 We are satisfied that the military judge did not abuse his discretion regard-
ing this issue. In addition, even if the military judge erred in allowing the 
materials into evidence, we hold that the appellant suffered no unfair preju-
dice, as we are confident that the members gave the books little weight. The 
members certainly recognized that many soldiers, including the appellant, 
possess books and catalogs that featured military equipment, including 
knives. We also are confident that the members recognized that many sol-
diers were likely to have materials about knives and guns in their personal 
libraries. 
 This murder case is unusual only in regard to the decapitation and display 
of the head.  There was little if any dispute as to the acts involved.  Our review 
of the record convinces us that the government carried the burden to prove 
premeditated murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Our review also convinces 
us that the alleged errors are without merit. 
 The findings of guilty and the sentence are affirmed. 
 Senior Judge GRAVELLE and Judge ECKER concur. 
 [The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted review of several is-
sues but affirmed the judgment of the Army Court of Criminal Appeals.  See 
49 M.J. 317 (C.A.A.F. 1998).  The Supreme Court denied certiorari.  See 525 
U.S. 1179 (1999).—Eds.] 
Points for Discussion 
 1.  Are the military courts capable of handling crimes of this magnitude?  
Should the military courts have jurisdiction over cases that have little to do 
with military discipline?  Would the outcome of the case likely have been the 
same or different if the case had been tried in a civilian court? 
 2.  Pursuant to a “Status of Forces Agreement” with Germany, most crimes 
by U.S. service members in Germany are tried by courts-martial rather than 
German courts.  Why might both Germany and the United States favor this 
arrangement? 
 
1-3.  Jurisdiction Over Military Persons and Offenses 
 Nearly everyone tried by court-martial is a service member accused of 
committing a crime while on active duty.  This includes both regular service 
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members (i.e., those who are always on active duty) and reservists and na-
tional guardsmen who have been mobilized or placed on active duty for train-
training.  Article 2(a)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1), unambiguously gives 
courts-martial jurisdiction over these service members by saying: “The fol-
lowing persons are subject to this chapter . . . [m]embers of a regular compo-
nent of the armed force . . . and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, 
or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are 
required by the terms of the call or order to obey it.” 
 This observation raises two questions.  The first is whether a court-martial 
has jurisdiction to try anyone other than a service member on active duty.  
The second is whether the offense for which a person is tried by court-martial 
must be connected to the person’s service.  These questions are considered in 
turn. 
Persons Subject to Court-Martial 
 Although most of the accused who are tried by court-martial are service 
members on active duty, Article 2(a)(2)-(13), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2)-
(13), reprinted in the margin,* lists twelve additional categories of persons 
                                                          
* 10 U.S.C . § 802.  Art. 2. Persons subject to this chapter 
(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter: 
(1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting 
discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of 
their muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their 
actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered 
into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are 
required by the terms of the call or order to obey it. 
(2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen. 
(3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty training, but in the case 
of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National 
Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. 
(4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to 
pay. 
(5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization from 
an armed force. 
(6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. 
(7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-
martial. 
(8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health 
Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces. 
(9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces. 
(10) In time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or ac-
companying an armed force in the field. 
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party 
or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or 
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subject to trial by court-martial.  Some of these additional categories are well-
accepted.  For example, it is perhaps not surprising that Military Academy 
cadets and Naval Academy midshipmen are subject to court-martial jurisdic-
tion, under Article 2(a)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2), because they live 
according to very strict military discipline.  But other categories are more 
controversial.  Few military retirees who are receiving retired pay probably 
realize that retirees can be and occasionally are tried by court-martial.  In-
deed, in recent years a retired Army major general was convicted of a 
fraternization-type offense, see Robert Burns, Retired General Demoted, 
Wash. Post, Sept. 3, 1999, at A25, and a retired Army master sergeant was 
sentenced to death for committing three murders, see Hennis v. Hemlick,  
2012 WL 120054 (4th Cir. 2012).  Similarly, during the United States’ military 
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan,  it has relied on private companies 
(typically called “contractors”) to carry out tasks such as driving trucks, run-
ning dining facilities, translating foreign languages, and so forth.  The 
employees for these contractors are all subject to trial by court-martial be-
cause they are, in the words of Article 2(a)(11), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(11), 
“[i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or 
accompanying an armed force in the field.”  In reality, however, only a few 
have faced a court-martial to date. 
 An interesting though mostly theoretical question is whether the Constitu-
tion places any limits on the power of courts-martial to try civilians.  The Su-
preme Court addressed this issue most notably in the following landmark 
decision.  In reading the decision, note that it lacks a majority opinion: Jus-
tice Black wrote a plurality opinion for four justices and Justice Frankfurter 
and Justice Harlan wrote separate concurrences in the judgment, while Jus-
tice Clark wrote a dissent which Justice Burton joined.  Justice Whitaker did 
not participate.  Thus, there were seven Justices on one side, and two on the 
other, but no opinion received five votes. 
                                                                                                                                                       
accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 
(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a par-
ty or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or 
otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the 
control of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 
(13) Individuals belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of 
the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 
12, 1949 (6 UST 3316), who violate the law of war. 
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REID v. COVERT 
U.S. Supreme Court 
354 U.S. 1 (1957) 
Mr. Justice BLACK announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an 
opinion, in which The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, and Mr. Jus-
tice BRENNAN join. 
 These cases raise basic constitutional issues of the utmost concern. They 
call into question the role of the military under our system of government. 
They involve the power of Congress to expose civilians to trial by military tri-
bunals, under military regulations and procedures, for offenses against the 
United States thereby depriving them of trial in civilian courts, under civilian 
laws and procedures and with all the safeguards of the Bill of Rights. These 
cases are particularly significant because for the first time since the adoption 
of the Constitution wives of soldiers have been denied trial by jury in a court 
of law and forced to trial before courts-martial. 
 In No. 701 Mrs. Clarice Covert killed her husband, a sergeant in the United 
States Air Force, at an airbase in England. Mrs. Covert, who was not a mem-
ber of the armed services, was residing on the base with her husband at the 
time. She was tried by a court-martial for murder under Article 118 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The trial was on charges preferred 
by Air Force personnel and the court-martial was composed of Air Force of-
ficers. The court-martial asserted jurisdiction over Mrs. Covert under Article 
2(11) of the UCMJ, which provides: 
 The following persons are subject to this code: 
(11) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the Unit-
ed States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, 
all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces 
without the continental limits of the United States * * *. 
 Counsel for Mrs. Covert contended that she was insane at the time she 
killed her husband, but the military tribunal found her guilty of murder and 
sentenced her to life imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the Air 
Force Board of Review, but was reversed by the Court of Military Appeals, 
because of prejudicial errors concerning the defense of insanity. While Mrs. 
Covert was being held in this country pending a proposed retrial by court-
martial in the District of Columbia, her counsel petitioned the District Court 
for a writ of habeas corpus to set her free on the ground that the Constitution 
forbade her trial by military authorities. Construing this Court’s decision in 
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) as holding that ‘a ci-
vilian is entitled to a civilian trial’ the District Court held that Mrs. Covert 
could not be tried by courtmartial and ordered her released from custody. 
The Government appealed directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. 
 In No. 713 Mrs. Dorothy Smith killed her husband, an Army officer, at a 
post in Japan where she was living with him. She was tried for murder by a 
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court-martial and despite considerable evidence that she was insane was 
found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The judgment was approved 
by the Army Board of Review, and the Court of Military Appeals. Mrs. Smith 
was then confined in a federal penitentiary in West Virginia. Her father, re-
spondent here, filed a petition for habeas corpus in a District Court for West 
Virginia.  The petition charged that the court-martial was without jurisdiction 
because Article 2(11) of the UCMJ was unconstitutional insofar as it author-
ized the trial of civilian dependents accompanying servicemen overseas. The 
District Court refused to issue the writ, and while an appeal was pending in 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit we granted certiorari at the re-
quest of the Government. 
 The two cases were consolidated and argued last Term and a majority of 
the Court, with three Justices dissenting and one reserving opinion, held that 
military trial of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert for their alleged offenses was 
constitutional. 351 U.S. 470 (1956). The majority held that the provisions of 
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments which require that crimes be 
tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury did not protect an American 
citizen when he was tried by the American Government in foreign lands for 
offenses committed there and that Congress could provide for the trial of such 
offenses in any manner it saw fit so long as the procedures established were 
reasonable and consonant with due process. The opinion then went on to ex-
press the view that military trials, as now practiced, were not unreasonable or 
arbitrary when applied to dependents accompanying members of the armed 
forces overseas. In reaching their conclusion the majority found it unneces-
sary to consider the power of Congress “To make Rules for the Government 
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” under Article I, § 8, cl. 14 of the 
Constitution. 
 Subsequently, the Court granted a petition for rehearing. Now, after fur-
ther argument and consideration, we conclude that the previous decisions 
cannot be permitted to stand. We hold that Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert could 
not constitutionally be tried by military authorities. 
I. 
 At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against 
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States is en-
tirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no other 
source.  It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.  When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is 
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution 
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because 
he happens to be in another land. . . . 
 The rights and liberties which citizens of our country enjoy are not pro-
tected by custom and tradition alone, they have been jealously preserved from 
the encroachments of Government by express provisions of our written Con-
stitution. 
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 Among those provisions, Art. III, § 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
are directly relevant to these cases. Article III, § 2 lays down the rule that: 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; 
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall 
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. 
The Fifth Amendment declares: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; * * *. 
And the Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed * * *. 
 The language of Art. III, § 2 manifests that constitutional protections for 
the individual were designed to restrict the United States Government when 
it acts outside of this country, as well as here at home. After declaring that all 
criminal trials must be by jury, the section states that when a crime is “not 
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by Law have directed.” If this language is permitted to have its 
obvious meaning, § 2 is applicable to criminal trials outside of the States as a 
group without regard to where the offense is committed or the trial held. 
From the very first Congress, federal statutes have implemented the provi-
sions of § 2 by providing for trial of murder and other crimes committed out-
side the jurisdiction of any State “in the district where the offender is appre-
hended, or into which he may first be brought.”  The Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, like Art. III, § 2, are also all inclusive with their sweeping refer-
ences to “no person” and to “all criminal prosecutions.” 
 * * * 
II. 
 At the time of Mrs. Covert’s alleged offense, an executive agreement was in 
effect between the United States and Great Britain which permitted United 
States’ military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted in Great Britain by American servicemen or their dependents. For its 
part, the United States agreed that these military courts would be willing and 
able to try and to punish all offenses against the laws of Great Britain by such 
persons. In all material respects, the same situation existed in Japan when 
Mrs. Smith killed her husband. Even though a court-martial does not give an 
accused trial by jury and other Bill of Rights protections, the Government 
contends that article 2(11) of UCMJ, insofar as it provides for the military tri-
al of dependents accompanying the armed forces in Great Britain and Japan, 
can be sustained as legislation which is necessary and proper to carry out the 
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United States’ obligations under the international agreements made with 
those countries. The obvious and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no 
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any 
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Consti-
tution. 
 * * * 
 In summary, we conclude that the Constitution in its entirety applied to 
the trials of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert. Since their court-martial did not 
meet the requirements of Art. III, § 2, or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments we 
are compelled to determine if there is anything within the Constitution which 
authorizes the military trial of dependents accompanying the armed forces 
overseas. 
III. 
 Article I, § 8, cl. 14, empowers Congress “To make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” It has been held that this 
creates an exception to the normal method of trial in civilian courts as pro-
vided by the Constitution and permits Congress to authorize military trial of 
members of the armed services without all the safeguards given an accused by 
Article III and the Bill of Rights. But if the language of Clause 14 is given its 
natural meaning, the power granted does not extend to civilians—even 
though they may be dependents living with servicemen on a military base.  
The term “land and naval Forces” refers to persons who are members of the 
armed services and not to their civilian wives, children and other dependents. 
It seems inconceivable that Mrs. Covert or Mrs. Smith could have been tried 
by military authorities as members of the “land and naval Forces” had they 
been living on a military post in this country.  Yet this constitutional term 
surely has the same meaning everywhere.  The wives of servicemen are no 
more members of the “land and naval Forces” when living at a military post in 
England or Japan than when living at a base in this country or in Hawaii or 
Alaska. 
 * * * 
 The tradition of keeping the military subordinate to civilian authority may 
not be so strong in the minds of this generation as it was in the minds of those 
who wrote the Constitution. The idea that the relatives of soldiers could be 
denied a jury trial in a court of law and instead be tried by court-martial un-
der the guise of regulating the armed forces would have seemed incredible to 
those men, in whose lifetime the right of the military to try soldiers for any 
offenses in time of peace had only been grudgingly conceded. The Founders 
envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to liberty if 
not confined within its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. 
They knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military lead-
ers.  They were familiar with the history of Seventeenth Century England, 
where Charles I tried to govern through the army and without Parliament. 
During this attempt, contrary to the Common Law, he used courts-martial to 
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try soldiers for certain non-military offenses.  This court-martialing of sol-
diers in peacetime evoked strong protests from Parliament. . . . 
 * * * 
 The generation that adopted the Constitution did not distrust the military 
because of past history alone. Within their own lives they had seen royal gov-
ernors sometimes resort to military rule. British troops were quartered in 
Boston at various times from 1768 until the outbreak of the Revolutionary 
War to support unpopular royal governors and to intimidate the local popu-
lace. The trial of soldiers by courts-martial and the interference of the mili-
tary with the civil courts aroused great anxiety and antagonism not only in 
Massachusetts but throughout the colonies. . . . 
 In light of this history, it seems clear that the Founders had no intention to 
permit the trial of civilians in military courts, where they would be denied ju-
ry trials and other constitutional protections, merely by giving Congress the 
power to make rules which were “necessary and proper” for the regulation of 
the “land and naval Forces.” Such a latitudinarian interpretation of these 
clauses would be at war with the well-established purpose of the Founders to 
keep the military strictly within its proper sphere, subordinate to civil au-
thority. The Constitution does not say that Congress can regulate “the land 
and naval Forces and all other persons whose regulation might have some 
relationship to maintenance of the land and naval Forces.” There is no indi-
cation that the Founders contemplated setting up a rival system of military 
courts to compete with civilian courts for jurisdiction over civilians who 
might have some contact or relationship with the armed forces. Courts-mar-
tial were not to have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law over non-mil-
itary America. 
 In No. 701, Reid v. Covert, the judgment of the District Court directing the 
Mrs. Covert be released from custody is affirmed. 
 In No. 713, Kinsella v. Krueger, the judgment of the District Court is re-
versed and the case is remanded with instructions to order Mrs. Smith re-
leased from custody. 
Mr. Justice WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or decision of the-
se cases. 
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER,* concurring in the result. 
                                                          
* Justice Felix Frankfurter was a major in the U.S. Army Reserve, Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps, while serving on the U.S. Supreme Court.  By his own admission, he 
avoided wearing his uniform whenever possible.  He explained:  “The reason I didn’t 
want to go into uniform was  because I knew  enough  about  the  doings in  the  War  
Department  to  know that every  pipsqueak  Colonel  would  feel that he was more 
important  than  a  Major . . . . As  a  civilian  I  could  get  into  the presence  of  a  
General  without  saluting,  clicking  my  heels,  and having  the  Colonel  outside  say, 
‘You  wait.  He’s got  a  Colonel  in there.’ ”  The Army Lawyer: A History of the 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 1775-1975 118 (1975).—Eds. 
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 * * * 
 Trial by court-martial is constitutionally permissible only for persons who 
can, on a fair appraisal, be regarded as falling within the authority given to 
Congress under Article I to regulate the “land and naval Forces,” and who 
therefore are not protected by specific provisions of Article III and the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments. . . . 
 * * * 
 The prosecution by court-martial for capital crimes committed by civilian 
dependents of members of the armed forces abroad is hardly to be deemed, 
under modern conditions, obviously appropriate to the effective exercise of 
the power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces” when it is a question of deciding what power is granted under 
Article I and therefore what restriction is made on Article III and the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments. I do not think that the proximity, physical and social, 
of these women to the ‘land and naval Forces’ is, with due regard to all that 
has been put before us, so clearly demanded by the effective “Government 
and Regulation” of those forces as reasonably to demonstrate a justification 
for court-martial jurisdiction over capital offenses. 
 The Government speaks of the “great potential impact on military disci-
pline” of these accompanying civilian dependents. This cannot be denied, nor 
should its implications be minimized. But the notion that discipline over mil-
itary personnel is to be furthered by subjecting their civilian dependents to 
the threat of capital punishment imposed by court-martial is too hostile to the 
reasons that underlie the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights for those 
safeguards to be displaced. It is true that military discipline might be affected 
seriously if civilian dependents could commit murders and other capital 
crimes with impunity. No one, however, challenges the availability to Con-
gress of a power to provide for trial and punishment of these dependents for 
such crimes.  The method of trial alone is in issue. . . . 
 * * * 
 I therefore conclude that, in capital cases, the exercise of court-martial ju-
risdiction over civilian dependents in time of peace cannot be justified by 
Article I, considered in connection with the specific protections of Article III 
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
 * * * 
Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring in the result. 
 I concur in the result, on the narrow ground that where the offense is capi-
tal, Article 2(11) cannot constitutionally be applied to the trial of civilian de-
pendents of members of the armed forces over-seas in times of peace. 
 * * * 
 For analytical purposes, I think it useful to break down the issue before us 
into two questions: First, is there a rational connection between the trial of 
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these army wives by court-martial and the power of Congress to make rules 
for the governance of the land and naval forces; in other words, is there any 
initial power here at all? Second, if there is such a rational connection, to 
what extent does this statute, though reasonably calculated to subserve an 
enumerated power, collide with other express limitations on congressional 
power; in other words, can this statute, however appropriate to the Article I 
power looked at in isolation, survive against the requirements of Article III 
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments? I recognize that these two questions 
are ultimately one and the same, since the scope of the Article I power is not 
separable from the limitations imposed by Article III and the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. Nevertheless I think it will make for clarity of analysis to con-
sider them separately. 
 * * * 
 . . . I cannot say that the court-martial jurisdiction here involved has no 
rational connection with the stated power. The Government, it seems to me, 
has made a strong showing that the court-martial of civilian dependents 
abroad has a close connection to the proper and effective functioning of our 
overseas military contingents. There is no need to detail here the various as-
pects of this connection, which have been well dealt with in the dissenting 
opinion of my brother CLARK. Suffice it to say that to all intents and pur-
poses these civilian dependents are part of the military community overseas, 
are so regarded by the host country, and must be subjected to the same disci-
pline if the military commander is to have the power to prevent activities 
which would jeopardize the security and effectiveness of his command. . . . 
 It seems to me clear on such a basis that these dependents, when sent 
overseas by the Government, become pro tanto a part of the military commu-
nity. I cannot say, therefore, that it is irrational or arbitrary for Congress to 
subject them to military discipline. I do not deal now, of course, with the 
problem of alternatives to court-martial jurisdiction; all that needs to be es-
tablished at this stage is that, viewing Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 in isolation, subjection 
of civilian dependents overseas to court-martial jurisdiction can in no wise be 
deemed unrelated to the power of Congress to make all necessary and proper 
laws to insure the effective governance of our overseas land and naval forces. 
 I turn now to the other side of the coin. For no matter how practical and 
how reasonable this jurisdiction might be, it still cannot be sustained if the 
Constitution guarantees to these army wives a trial in an Article III court, 
with indictment by grand jury and jury trial as provided by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. 
 * * * 
 . . . I cannot agree with the sweeping proposition that a full Article III trial, 
with indictment and trial by jury, is required in every case for the trial of a 
civilian dependent of a serviceman overseas. The Government, it seems to 
me, has made an impressive showing that at least for the run-of-the-mill of-
fenses committed by dependents overseas, such a requirement would be as 
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impractical and anomalous as it would have been to require jury trial for Bal-
zac in Porto Rico. Again, I need not go into details, beyond stating that except 
for capital offenses, such as we have here, to which, in my opinion, special 
considerations apply, I am by no means ready to say that Congress’ power to 
provide for trial by court-martial of civilian dependents overseas is limited by 
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Where, if at all, the dividing 
line should be drawn among cases not capital, need not now be decided.  We 
are confronted here with capital offenses alone; and it seems to me particu-
larly unwise now to decide more than we have to.  Our far-flung foreign mili-
tary establishments are a new phenomenon in our national life, and I think it 
would be unfortunate were we unnecessarily to foreclose, as my four brothers 
would do, our future consideration of the broad questions involved in main-
taining the effectiveness of these national outposts, in the light of continuing 
experience with these problems. 
 So far as capital cases are concerned, I think they stand on quite a different 
footing than other offenses. In such cases the law is especially sensitive to 
demands for that procedural fairness which inheres in a civilian trial where 
the judge and trier of fact are not responsive to the command of the conven-
ing authority. I do not concede that whatever process is “due” an offender 
faced with a fine or a prison sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of 
the Constitution in a capital case. . . . In fact, the Government itself has con-
ceded that one grave offense, treason, presents a special case: ‘The gravity of 
this offense is such that we can well assume that, whatever difficulties may be 
involved in trial far from the scene of the offense . . . the trial should be in our 
courts.”  I see no reason for not applying the same principle to any case where 
a civilian dependent stands trial on pain of life itself. The number of such cas-
es would appear to be so negligible that the practical problems of affording 
the defendant a civilian trial would not present insuperable problems. 
 On this narrow ground I concur in the result in these cases. 
Mr. Justice CLARK, with whom Mr. Justice BURTON joins, dissenting. 
 The Court today releases two women from prosecution though the evi-
dence shows that they brutally killed their husbands, both American soldiers, 
while stationed with them in quarters furnished by our armed forces on its 
military installations in foreign lands. . . . 
 Mr. Justice BURTON and I remain convinced that the former opinions of 
the Court are correct and that they set forth valid constitutional doctrine un-
der the long-recognized cases of this Court. The opinions were neither written 
nor agreed to in haste and they reflect the consensus of the majority reached 
after thorough discussion at many conferences. In fact, the cases were here 
longer both before and after argument than many of the cases we decide. We 
adhere to the views there expressed since we are convinced that through them 
we were neither “mortgaging the future,” as is claimed, nor foreclosing the 
present, as does the judgment today. We do not include a discussion of the 
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theory upon which those former judgments were entered because we are sat-
isfied with its handling in the earlier opinions. 
Points for Discussion 
 1. How did the plurality opinion and the two concurrences in judgment 
differ from each other? 
 2. Does Reid v. Covert prevent a court-martial from trying a civilian ac-
companying the force in the field, such as a cafeteria worker or truck me-
chanic who commits murder? 
 3. Clarice Covert killed her husband, a master sergeant in the Air Force, by 
striking him with an ax as he lay sleeping.  Dorothy Smith, who happened to 
be the daughter of an Army General, killed her husband, an Army Colonel, by 
stabbing him with a knife while he slept.  Both wives appeared to have psy-
chiatric problems and the murders had nothing directly to do with their hus-
band’s military service.  Imagine, however, that the facts were different and 
that the wives had committed crimes such as espionage on the military or 
murder for the purpose of sabotaging a military mission.  Could a court-mar-
tial try them in such circumstances? 
 4.  This case is said to be the only case in which the Supreme Court over-
ruled its previous judgment on rehearing.  It was successfully litigated by 
Frederick Bernays Wiener, a retired Army judge advocate and distinguished 
legal scholar at George Washington University, who gained considerable re-
nown for this accomplishment. 
 
 In Reid v. Covert, the plurality opinion observes that people of England 
were outraged that Charles I had used courts-martial to try soldiers for non-
military offenses during peacetime.  This practice, however, occurs constantly 
in the United States.  The military prosecutes soldiers for crimes that have no 
military connection and that take place not on any military premises.  For ex-
ample, if a soldier left the garrison, went into town in civilian clothes and 
used illegal drugs in a private home, he could be tried by a court-martial.  Is 
this constitutional?  In O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), the Su-
preme Court said that service members could be tried by court-martial only 
for service-related crimes.  But O’Callahan was overruled in the following 
case: 
SOLORIO v. UNITED STATES 
U.S. Supreme Court 
483 U.S. 435 (1987) 
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial 
convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) to try a 
member of the Armed Forces depends on the “service connection” of the of-
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fense charged.  We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision in 
O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
 While petitioner Richard Solorio was on active duty in the Seventeenth 
Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska, he sexually abused two young daugh-
ters of fellow coastguardsmen.  Petitioner engaged in this abuse over a 2-year 
period until he was transferred by the Coast Guard to Governors Island, New 
York. Coast Guard authorities learned of the Alaska crimes only after peti-
tioner’s transfer, and investigation revealed that he had later committed 
similar sexual abuse offenses while stationed in New York. The Governors 
Island commander convened a general court-martial to try petitioner for 
crimes alleged to have occurred in Alaska and New York. 
 There is no “base” or “post” where Coast Guard personnel live and work in 
Juneau. Consequently, nearly all Coast Guard military personnel reside in the 
civilian community. Petitioner’s Alaska offenses were committed in his pri-
vately owned home, and the fathers of the 10- to 12-year-old victims in Alaska 
were active duty members of the Coast Guard assigned to the same command 
as petitioner. Petitioner’s New York offenses also involved daughters of fellow 
coastguardsmen, but were committed in Government quarters on the Gover-
nors Island base. 
 After the general court-martial was convened in New York, petitioner 
moved to dismiss the charges for crimes committed in Alaska on the ground 
that the court lacked jurisdiction under this Court’s decisions in O’Callahan 
v. Parker and Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 
355 (1971).  Ruling that the Alaska offenses were not sufficiently “service con-
nected” to be tried in the military criminal justice system, the court-martial 
judge granted the motion to dismiss. The Government appealed the dismissal 
of the charges to the United States Coast Guard Court of Military Review, 
which reversed the trial judge’s order and reinstated the charges. 
 The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed the Court of Military 
Review, concluding that the Alaska offenses were service connected within 
the meaning of O’Callahan and Relford. 21 M.J. 251 (1986). Stating that “not 
every off-base offense against a servicemember’s dependent is service-con-
nected,” the court reasoned that “sex offenses against young children . . . have 
a continuing effect on the victims and their families and ultimately on the 
morale of any military unit or organization to which the family member is as-
signed.” . . . We now affirm. 
 The Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 14.  Exercising this authority, Congress has empowered courts-martial 
to try servicemen for the crimes proscribed by the U.C.M.J., Arts. 2, 17, 10 
U.S.C. §§ 802, 817. The Alaska offenses with which petitioner was charged are 
each described in the U.C.M.J. Thus it is not disputed that the court-martial 
convened in New York possessed the statutory authority to try petitioner on 
the Alaska child abuse specifications. 
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 In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, this Court interpreted 
the Constitution as conditioning the proper exercise of court-martial juris-
diction over an offense on one factor: the military status of the accused. Gosa 
v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opinion); see Kinsella v. Unit-
ed States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-241, 243 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1957) (plurality opinion) . . . ; cf. United States ex rel. Toth 
v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) . . . .  This view was premised on what the 
Court described as the “natural meaning” of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the 
Fifth Amendment’s exception for “cases arising in the land or naval forces.” 
Reid v. Covert, supra, 354 U.S., at 19; United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 
supra, 350 U.S., at 15.  As explained in Kinsella v. Singleton, supra: 
 “The test for jurisdiction . . . is one of status, namely, whether the ac-
cused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as 
falling within the term ‘land and naval Forces.’. . .” Id., 361 U.S., at 240-
241. 
 “Without contradiction, the materials . . . show that military jurisdiction 
has always been based on the ‘status’ of the accused, rather than on the na-
ture of the offense. To say that military jurisdiction ‘defies definition in 
terms of military “status” ’ is to defy the unambiguous  language of Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 14, as well as the historical background thereof and the precedents 
with reference thereto.” Id., at 243. 
 Implicit in the military status test was the principle that determinations 
concerning the scope of court-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by 
servicemen was a matter reserved for Congress: 
“[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to 
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil 
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be 
struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to 
Congress.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) 
(footnote omitted). 
 In 1969, the Court in O’Callahan v. Parker departed from the military sta-
tus test and announced the “new constitutional principle” that a military tri-
bunal may not try a serviceman charged with a crime that has no service con-
nection.  See Gosa v. Mayden, supra, 361 U.S., at 673.  Applying this prin-
ciple, the O’Callahan Court held that a serviceman’s off-base sexual assault 
on a civilian with no connection with the military could not be tried by court-
martial.  On reexamination of O’Callahan, we have decided that the service 
connection test announced in that decision should be abandoned. 
 The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the Armed Forc-
es, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, appears in the same section as do the provisions granting 
Congress authority, inter alia, to regulate commerce among the several States, 
to coin money, and to declare war.  On its face there is no indication that the 
grant of power in Clause 14 was any less plenary than the grants of other au-
thority to Congress in the same section. Whatever doubts there might be 
CH. 1 OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 43 
 
 
about the extent of Congress’ power under Clause 14 to make rules for the 
“Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” that power surely 
embraces the authority to regulate the conduct of persons who are actually 
members of the Armed Services. As noted by Justice Harlan in his O’Callahan 
dissent, there is no evidence in the debates over the adoption of the Constitu-
tion that the Framers intended the language of Clause 14 to be accorded 
anything other than its plain meaning.  Alexander Hamilton described these 
powers of Congress “essential to the common defense” as follows: 
“These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to 
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the corre-
spondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to sat-
isfy them. . . . 
 * * * 
“. . . Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary for this purpose [com-
mon safety]? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all 
laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them.” The Feder-
alist No. 23, pp. 152-154 (E. Bourne ed. 1947). 
 The O’Callahan Court’s historical foundation for its holding rests on the 
view that “[b]oth in England prior to the American Revolution and in our own 
national history military trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses has 
been viewed with suspicion.” 395 U.S., at 268. According to the Court, the 
historical evidence demonstrates that, during the late 17th and 18th centuries 
in England as well as the early years of this country, courts-martial did not 
have authority to try soldiers for civilian offenses. . . . 
 The O’Callahan Court’s representation of English history following the 
Mutiny Act of 1689, however, is less than accurate. In particular, the Court 
posited that “[i]t was . . . the rule in Britain at the time of the American Rev-
olution that a soldier could not be tried for a civilian offense committed in 
Britain; instead military officers were required to use their energies and office 
to insure that the accused soldier would be tried before a civil court.” 395 
U.S., at 269. In making this statement, the Court was apparently referring to 
Section XI, Article I, of the British Articles of War in effect at the time of the 
Revolution.  This Article provided: 
 “Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a Capital Crime, or of 
having used Violence, or committed any Offence against the Persons or 
Property of Our Subjects, . . . the Commanding Officer, and Officers of eve-
ry Regiment, Troop, or Party to which the . . . accused shall belong, are 
hereby required, upon Application duly made by, or in behalf of the Party 
or Parties injured, to use . . . utmost Endeavors to deliver over such ac-
cused . . . to the Civil Magistrate.” British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted 
in G. Davis, Military Law of the United States 581, 589 (3d rev. ed. 1915). 
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This provision, however, is not the sole statement in the Articles bearing on 
court-martial jurisdiction over civilian offenses. Specifically, Section XIV, Ar-
ticle XVI, provided that all officers and soldiers who 
“shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging to any of 
Our Subjects, unless by Order of the then Commander in Chief of Our 
Forces, to annoy Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us, he or they 
that shall be found guilty of offending herein shall (besides such Penalties 
as they are liable to by law) be punished according to the Nature and De-
gree of the Offence, by the Judgment of a Regimental or General Court 
Martial.” Id., at 593. 
Under this provision, military tribunals had jurisdiction over offenses pun-
ishable under civil law.  Accordingly, the O’Callahan Court erred in suggesting 
that, at the time of the American Revolution, military tribunals in England 
were available “only where ordinary civil courts were unavailable.” 395 U.S., 
at 269, and n. 11. 
 The history of early American practice furnishes even less support to 
O’Callahan’s historical thesis. The American Articles of War of 1776, which 
were based on the British Articles, contained a provision similar to Section 
XI, Article I, of the British Articles, requiring commanding officers to deliver 
over to civil magistrates any officer or soldier accused of “a capital crime, . . . 
having used violence, or . . . any offence against the persons or property of the 
good people of any of the United American States” upon application by or on 
behalf of an injured party.  It has been postulated that American courts-mar-
tial had jurisdiction over the crimes described in this provision where no ap-
plication for a civilian trial was made by or on behalf of the injured civilian.  
Indeed, American military records reflect trials by court-martial during the 
late 18th century for offenses against civilians and punishable under civil law, 
such as theft and assault. 
 The authority to try soldiers for civilian crimes may be found in the much-
disputed  “general article” of the 1776 Articles of War, which allowed court-
martial jurisdiction over “[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders and ne-
glects which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good 
order and military discipline.” American Articles of War of 1776, Section 
XVIII, Article 5.  Some authorities, such as those cited by the O’Callahan 
Court, interpreted this language as limiting court-martial jurisdiction to 
crimes that had a direct impact on military discipline.  Several others, how-
ever, have interpreted the language as encompassing all noncapital crimes 
proscribed by the civil law. . . . 
 George Washington also seems to have held this view. When informed of 
the decision of a military court that a complaint by a civilian against a mem-
ber of the military should be redressed only in a civilian court, he stated in a 
General Order dated February 24, 1779: 
“All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or soldier being de-
structive of good order and discipline as well as subversive of the rights of 
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society is as much a breach of military, as civil law and as punishable by 
the one as the other.” 14 Writings of George Washington 140-141 (J. Fitz-
patrick ed. 1936). 
We think the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and in this 
country during the 17th and 18th centuries is far too ambiguous to justify the 
restriction on the plain language of Clause 14 which O’Callahan imported into 
it.  There is no doubt that the English practice during this period shows a 
strong desire in that country to transfer from the Crown to Parliament the 
control of the scope of court-martial jurisdiction.  And it is equally true that 
Parliament was chary in granting jurisdiction to courts-martial, although not 
as chary as the O’Callahan opinion suggests. But reading Clause 14 consist-
ently with its plain language does not disserve that concern; Congress, and 
not the Executive, was given the authority to make rules for the regulation of 
the Armed Forces. 
 * * * 
 When considered together with the doubtful foundations of O’Callahan, 
the confusion wrought by the decision leads us to conclude that we should 
read Clause 14 in accord with the plain meaning of its language as we did in 
the many years before O’Callahan was decided. That case’s novel approach to 
court-martial jurisdiction must bow “to the lessons of experience and the 
force of better reasoning.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 
406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  We therefore hold that the re-
quirements of the Constitution are not violated where, as here, a court-mar-
tial* is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the Armed Ser-
vices at the time of the offense charged. The judgment of the Court of Military 
Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
Justice STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
 Today’s unnecessary overruling of precedent is most unwise. The opinion 
of the United States Court of Military Appeals demonstrates that petitioner’s 
offenses were sufficiently “service connected” to confer jurisdiction on the 
military tribunal. . . . 
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, and with whom 
Justice BLACKMUN joins . . . . 
 * * * 
 The requirement of service connection recognized in O’Callahan has a le-
gitimate basis in constitutional language and a solid historical foundation.  It 
should be applied in this case. 
 * * * 
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Points for Discussion 
 1. If a court-martial could not try soldiers for crimes that are not service-
related, could they still be tried by some other court? 
 2. What advantages and disadvantages did the O’Callahan decision have 
for soldiers and the Armed Forces? 
 3. Could Congress by statute strip courts-martial of jurisdiction to try ser-
vice members for crimes that are not service related?  If so, why might Con-
gress not have done so? 
 
Overlapping Jurisdiction 
  Service members who commit crimes in the United States potentially 
could face prosecution in any of three different court systems.  For example, 
suppose that Army Private Pogie sells marijuana in Virginia.  He could be 
prosecuted in a court-martial for violating Article 112a, UCMJ.  Alternatively, 
he could be prosecuted in federal court for violating federal anti-narcotics 
laws applicable to all persons within the United States.  In addition, he could 
be prosecuted in Virginia state court for violating a Virginia state anti-nar-
cotics law.  Private Pogie’s status as a service member does not exempt him 
from the application of any federal or state laws. 
 That said, it is most likely that Private Pogie would be tried in a court-mar-
tial.  The Department of Justice and the Department of Defense have entered 
into a memorandum of understanding, reprinted in Appendix 3 of the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial, that establishes a presumption that service members 
will be tried in courts-martial rather than federal district court for crimes 
usually prosecuted under the UCMJ.  The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition 
against Double Jeopardy prevents a service member from being tried by both 
a federal district court and a court-martial. 
 Most state prosecutors are eager to allow military prosecutors to bring 
cases against service members.  But nothing prevents state prosecution of a 
service member for violating state law.  Indeed, because the states and federal 
government are separate sovereigns, a service member could be tried in both 
a state court and court-martial for the same offense without violating the 
prohibition against double-jeopardy.  Although dual prosecutions are rare, 
they do happen.  Consider the following case: 
UNITED STATES v. SCHNEIDER 
U.S. Army Court of Military Review 
34 M.J. 639 (A.C.M.R. 1992) 
De GIULIO, Senior Judge: 
 Appellant [Major David P. Schneider, U.S. Army] was tried by general 
court-martial for attempted murder of his wife and two specifications of con-
duct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman by committing perjury and by 
having sexual intercourse with and otherwise engaging in a sexual or other 
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improper affair with a woman not his wife in violation of Articles 80 and 133, 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880 and 933 (1982) [herein-
after UCMJ]. Contrary to his pleas, a court consisting of officer members 
found him guilty and sentenced him to dismissal, confinement for twenty-
three years, and total forfeitures. The convening authority approved the sen-
tence except that he conditionally suspended the forfeiture in excess of 
$400.00 pay per month until execution of the dismissal. 
 Appellant asserts several errors which we find to be without merit.  We 
affirm the findings of guilty and the sentence. 
 This is a case where the offenses were motivated by love and money.  In 
1987, appellant was assigned to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
in California.  He moved to the area with his wife and two children.  While 
working at the laboratory, he met Paula, with whom he worked for a time on a 
daily basis. In August 1987, Paula’s friends asked Paula, the appellant, and 
appellant’s family to accompany them on a boat trip. Appellant indicated that 
his wife and children would not go because his wife feared for the safety of the 
children but, if permitted, he would go. During the boat trip which lasted 
overnight, appellant and Paula shared adjoining quarters at the opposite end 
of the boat from where the other passengers were quartered. In April of 1989, 
according to Paula, her relationship with appellant became sexual and inti-
mate.2 
 In July 1989, appellant told his wife that he had to go on a mission for the 
laboratory; but, due to its classified nature, he could not tell her of its loca-
tion, other details, or point of contact for emergencies.  In fact, appellant and 
Paula traveled to Hawaii where they stayed together in the King Kame-
hameha Hotel, Kailua, Hawaii. 
 In 1989, appellant was assigned to attend the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. At Fort Leavenworth, he 
moved his family into government quarters. In August 1989, he met with an 
insurance agent.  Although the agent recommended appellant increase insur-
ance coverage on himself, appellant declined to do so but stated he wanted an 
additional $150,000 coverage on his wife, Debbie. This policy, with appellant 
as the beneficiary, was effective 1 October 1989. 
 In the fall of 1989, appellant purchased a home in Tracey, California. He 
convinced Debbie that her name should not be on the title.  He used the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the family home near his prior assignment for the pur-
chase of this house. He told her that he had to go to California to take care of 
details of this purchase over Labor Day weekend of 1989. He spent that week-
end with Paula. Paula told a friend that it was the best weekend of her life. 
                                                          
2 Paula did not testify at the court-martial because she could not be found. Her prior 
testimony at appellant’s state criminal trial was admitted into evidence. It is evident 
from that testimony that she was re-luctant to testify and had refused to talk to pros-
ecutors before she testified. 
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 Numerous telephone calls were made between appellant at Fort Leaven-
worth and Paula in California. 
 After returning home from a party on the evening of 20 October 1989, 
Debbie went to bed and fell asleep. She awoke with intense pain in her head 
and was pulled up to a sitting position on the bed. She saw appellant standing 
next to the bed. The toilet tank lid from the bathroom was on the floor near 
his feet.  The toilet tank lid was broken.  She felt a baseball-sized lump on her 
head. The lump was “oozing.” 
  She brushed small pieces of porcelain from her hair. She described appel-
lant, who was normally calm and cool in time of crisis, as visibly shaken. He 
stated repeatedly, “you must have hit your head.” Appellant assisted her to 
the bathroom where she sat on the toilet. When she began shaking, he helped 
her to the bathroom floor and covered her with a quilt. He wanted to take her 
for medical attention but she wanted only to go back to bed. He assisted her 
to the bed. The next morning, he took her to the medical facility. When asked 
what had happened to her head, appellant stated to medical personnel that 
Debbie was sleepwalking, picked up the toilet tank lid, tripped, and hit her 
head. The statement that she was injured while sleepwalking was recorded on 
medical documents. Evidence of record indicates appellant’s wife had never 
walked in her sleep. When she returned home, Debbie found small pieces of 
the toilet tank lid on her pillow. This incident was the subject of the specifica-
tion alleging attempted murder. 
 On 28 October 1989, appellant took his wife for a “romantic” overnight 
stay in a local downtown hotel. The room was on the top floor. After dinner 
he tried to get her to drink more champagne than she normally consumed. 
After they went to their room, appellant tried to get her out on the balcony. 
She refused because it was too cold and because she was afraid of heights. 
 On 4 November 1989, appellant and his wife were to attend the Armor 
Ball. Without her knowledge, appellant made arrangements for another “ro-
mantic” night at Embassy Suites Hotel. She discovered his plans when the 
babysitter told him she could not stay overnight. Appellant decided to go to 
the hotel after the ball anyway but to return home early. At the ball Debbie 
enjoyed the dancing and only left early to go to the hotel at appellant’s insist-
ence. Although ap-pellant had asked for an eighth floor room when making 
reservations, he was given a room on the seventh floor. 
 Two sixteen-year-old girls, Chantel and Brandi, who were on the eighth 
floor, observed appellant and his wife when they entered the hotel. They were 
attracted to the couple because of their “extravagant attire.” They watched 
appellant and his wife ride the glass elevator to the eighth floor and watched 
them walk side by side down the hallway. Brandi looked away. Chantel saw 
appellant make vigorous hand movements in front of his wife as she faced 
him with her back to the rail. She observed appellant put his left arm around 
Debbie where the rail met her back, put his right hand on her chest, and flip 
her over the rail. Chantel watched Debbie plunge 70-80 feet and hit a table on 
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the atrium floor.3 Chantel watched appellant look over the railing, walk to-
ward the elevator, walk back to the railing and call for someone to call an am-
bulance. He then walked back to the elevator and proceeded down. Testimony 
indicates that appellant’s conduct when he reached the atrium floor can be 
described as cool and collected. Debbie’s pelvis was fractured in thirteen 
places. Both left and right femurs were broken in several places, with one 
bone penetrating her abdominal cavity, damaging her colon. She also had a 
fractured ankle and a fractured rib. Her colon injury required a temporary 
colostomy. While his wife was being wheeled into the operating room, he 
asked the doctor to give her a “tummy tuck.” Debbie’s roommate at the hos-
pital and the roommate’s mother described appellant’s attitude toward his 
wife while she was hospitalized as cool and distant. He was also described as a 
“jerk” in his attitude toward his wife. 
 On 2 December 1989, Debbie returned home from the hospital confined to 
a wheelchair. On 4 December, appellant told her that he didn’t love her any-
more and was getting a divorce. On 5 December, in an interview with local 
police, appellant admitted having an affair with Paula, stated he loved her 
and hoped to marry her when his divorce was final. On 6 December, appellant 
filed for divorce. Later, appellant was charged by local authorities with first 
degree assault for the incident at the Embassy Suites Hotel on 4 November. 
On 18 December, appellant moved to have his petition for divorce dismissed. 
 At his trial for attempted murder in state court, appellant testified that, at 
the Embassy Suites Hotel, they mistakenly went to the eighth floor.  He told 
his wife that he wanted to carry her across the threshold. He picked her up 
and was carrying her at high port when she told him they were in the wrong 
place. He turned and in doing so tripped. His wife slipped from his grasp, 
causing her to fall over the balcony railing to the atrium floor.  He testified 
that he did not intend to injure his wife. Appellant was acquitted of this of-
fense in the state court. 
 At the state trial, appellant also testified regarding the October toilet tank 
lid incident. He stated that his wife went to bed, and he stayed up to do his 
school homework. Before he went to bed, he noted the toilet was running. He 
removed the tank  lid and set it down against the cabinet. He fixed the toilet 
but decided to leave the tank lid off. He then went to bed and to sleep. He was 
awakened by a motion on the bed or noise. His wife was sitting on the bed, 
moaning, with her hand to her head. He got up to go to her but stepped on 
something. When he turned on the light, he discovered it to be “shards of ob-
viously pieces of the toilet tank lid.” She complained her head hurt, but upon 
his inquiry stated she didn’t know what had happened. He stated that it was 
clear to him that she had hurt herself somehow. He helped her to the bath-
room where she started to go into shock. He sat her on the toilet and turned 
on the faucet in the tub, in case he needed water. He then wrapped her in a 
blanket and checked to see if she could discern the number of fingers he held 
                                                          
3 Debbie has no memory of this event from the time she entered the hotel. 
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before her. He wanted to take her to the hospital but she refused. He con-
cluded she did not have a fracture, gave her aspirin, and took her to bed. He 
testified at his state trial that he told personnel at the hospital that, “She was 
probably sleepwalking. I don’t know or words to that effect.” He testified, “I 
don’t believe I would have told them she was sleepwalking, ‘cause Debbie has 
never sleptwalked, and so I wouldn’t say that.” 
 * * * 
 . . . [A]ppellant contends that the military judge erred by denying a motion 
to dismiss the specification of perjury because it violated appellant’s right 
against double jeopardy. Appellant’s argument is that his testimony in his 
state court trial went to the heart of the issue of the offense for which he was 
tried and was determined favorable to him. Thus, he argues, the government 
is collaterally estopped from charging appellant with perjury for his testi-
mony. We do not agree with appellant that double jeopardy applies here. 
 The doctrine of collateral estoppel has not been applied in military crimi-
nal law. United States v. Cuellar, 27 M.J. 50 (C.M.A. 1988), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 811 (1989). We see no reason to apply it here. Additionally, prosecution 
of an offense in state court does not normally bar a federal prosecution of the 
same criminal matter.  Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); Bartkus v. Il-
linois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). We 
find no merit in this assertion of error. 
 * * * 
 The findings of guilty and the sentence are affirmed. 
Judge HAESSIG and Judge ARKOW concur. 
[The Court of Military Appeals affirmed this decision, 38 M.J. 387 (C.M.A. 
1993), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 511 U.S. 1106 (1994).—Eds.] 
Points for Discussion 
 1. Why do you think both state and military authorities wanted to prose-
cute Major Schneider?  Is it unfair that he must face two prosecutions? 
 2. Could the court-martial have tried appellant for attempted murder even 
though he was acquitted of this offense in state court?  If so, why was he not 
charged with this offense? 
 3.  Would it make any difference if the accused was acquitted of capital 
murder in state court and then was recalled from retirement to face capital 
charges at a court-martial?  See Hennis v. Hemlick,  2012 WL 120054 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
 
1-4.  Role of the Commander and Unlawful Command Influence 
 The Military Justice system rests on two key postulates that are not inher-
ently in conflict, but that may collide in some instances.  The first postulate, 
clearly and concisely articulated by the President in the Manual for Courts-
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Martial, is:  “Commanders are responsible for good order and discipline in 
their commands.” MCM, pt. V, ¶1.d.(1).  The second postulate, expressed by 
Congress directly in the UCMJ, is: “No person subject to [the UCMJ] may at-
tempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a 
court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member thereof . . . .”  Ar-
ticle 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837(a). 
 The first postulate rests on the idea that a fighting force will be ineffective 
and perhaps dangerous unless it obeys orders and deports itself in a con-
trolled manner.  The only person who can achieve good order and discipline 
is the unit’s commander.  The commander accomplishes this difficult task 
primarily through strong leadership and effective drills and training.  But the-
se measures are not always enough.  When service members commit serious 
misconduct, the commander may decide that it is necessary to invoke the mil-
itary justice system.  Crimes that go unprosecuted may lead to other 
wrongdoing, and the breakdown of all order in the unit. 
 The second postulate rests on the idea that the military justice system 
must be just.  A court-martial must be a real court, where guilt or innocence is 
determined by disinterested judges and panel members based solely on the 
facts and the law.  Nothing could harm morale more, and in turn frustrate the 
mission of a military unit, than a belief among service members that they may 
be punished for acts they did not commit or that they may be treated overly 
harshly for crimes they did commit. 
 A potential conflict may arise because of the hierarchical nature of military 
life.  It is not difficult to imagine that, without constant vigilance, subordinate 
participants in the military justice system could be influenced by their superi-
ors, resulting in unfairness to the accused.  The general or admiral who con-
venes a court-martial in the belief that a prosecution is necessary typically is 
senior in rank to the military judge and the military lawyers involved in the 
trial, is senior in rank to all of the witnesses who are to testify, and is senior in 
rank to all of the officers and enlisted members who sit in judgment of the 
accused.  The system must provide protections so that everyone involved is 
not improperly influenced from those above. 
 The military justice system attempts to prevent this conflict in several 
ways.  It makes improper command influence a crime.  It pushes the initial 
decisions on how to address misconduct to the lowest level.  As described 
above, the service member’s immediate commander decides in the first in-
stance how to address alleged misconduct.  The immediate commander can 
forward the matter to a superior commander, or the superior commander can 
take the case from the immediate commander, but the superior commander 
cannot tell the immediate commander what to do.  There also can be no ser-
vice-wide or unit-wide prosecutorial policies. 
 How well do these measures work?  In general, most observers consider 
the military justice system to be fair.  Occasionally, however, allegations of 
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misconduct arise.  The following cases clarify the standards and provide 
modern illustrations. 
UNITED STATES v. BIAGASE 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
50 M.J. 143 (C.A.A.F. 1999) 
Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members con-
victed appellant [Keith J. Bagase, Lance Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps], con-
trary to his pleas, of attempted robbery (2 specifications), conspiracy to 
commit robbery (2 specifications), robbery (3 specifications), and assault 
consummated by a battery, in violation of Articles 80, 81, 122, and 128, Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 881, 922, and 928, respec-
tively. The court-martial sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, 
confinement for 15 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest en-
listed grade. The convening authority approved the sentence but suspended 
confinement in excess of 7 years for 4 years from the date of his action. The 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence in an un-
published opinion. 
 Factual Background 
 Appellant was apprehended as one of several suspects in a series of beat-
ings and robberies. He was interviewed by agents of the Naval Criminal In-
vestigative Service (NCIS), and he gave them a detailed confession admitting 
his involvement in one of the incidents. In his confession, he admitted con-
spiring with a group of fellow Marines to “jack people . . . because it sounded 
fun.” He defined the term “jack” as follows: 
When I say “jack people” I mean that we beat them up, kick them or what-
ever we have to do until they are hurt pretty bad and do not resist us any 
more.  After the people are down, laying on the ground and cannot resist 
because we hurt them, we take their money or whatever else we want to 
take. 
 Appellant admitted being one of a group of seven black Marines who sur-
rounded four “white guys” and “jacked” them. 
 At his court-martial, appellant made a timely motion to dismiss all charges 
and specifications on the grounds of unlawful command influence.  His de-
fense counsel asserted that, shortly after appellant confessed, copies of his 
confession were circulated within his unit, and references were made to his 
confession in unit formations. The defense asserted that the actions by ap-
pellant’s command had a chilling effect on potential defense witnesses that 
made a fair trial impossible.  The defense further asserted that the potential 
witnesses could testify to appellant’s good military character.  The defense did 
not assert that any substantive witnesses, i.e., eyewitnesses to the incident, 
were deterred from testifying. 
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 In support of the motion to dismiss, two witnesses were called by the de-
fense. Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Lawson, the noncommissioned officer-in-charge 
(NCOIC) of appellant’s duty section, testified that he learned about the “jack-
ing” incident on the Monday after it happened. He was “pretty distraught-
overwhelmed,” and “couldn’t really believe that it happened.”  He felt that it 
was his fault that one of his Marines was in trouble. He visited the senior 
NCO in the company, First Sergeant (1stSgt) Bressler, who “consoled” him 
and “tried to convey to [him] that it wasn’t really [his] fault.”  The first ser-
geant told SSgt Lawson that he wanted him to hold a formation and “let the 
Marines know that Marines don’t do these types of things.”  The first sergeant 
gave him a copy of appellant’s confession. 
 SSgt Lawson testified that his section, the bulk storage section, had a for-
mation every Tuesday.  As platoon sergeant, he ordinarily held the formation. 
Because of “the magnitude of this incident,” he asked Master Sergeant (MSgt) 
Stanton, the senior staff NCOIC, to discuss the incident. SSgt Lawson was not 
present when MSgt Stanton talked about it. 
 SSgt Lawson testified that no one tried to intimidate him or prevent him 
from testifying for appellant. He testified: 
I never thought that it would affect my career-in any way, shape, or form 
affect my career.  But perhaps it would affect the way people—some people 
thought of me as a person and as a staff NCO. Even though they would 
have never said it or would have affected my career on paper, but just the 
way people thought of me. 
 SSgt Lawson was asked if his officer-in-charge (OIC), Chief Warrant Of-
ficer (CWO) Harris, had made any comments about appellant. He testified 
that CWO Harris did not know appellant, but based solely on the statement, 
he thought that she would consider him a “thug or a punk.” 
 LCpl Calloway testified that he worked with appellant, and that appellant 
had taught him how to do his job in the hazardous materials section.  LCpl 
Calloway testified that, immediately after appellant was placed in pretrial 
confinement, “people from privates all the way up to staff NCOs” began to 
talk about what had happened. LCpl Calloway testified that 1stSgt Bressler 
talked about appellant’s confession at a unit formation, quoting from the 
statement with words like “jack,” “beat down,” and “robbed,” and telling the 
Marines, “I’m not going to tolerate this kind of stuff.” 
 LCpl Calloway testified that he was reluctant to testify when first ap-
proached by defense counsel, because he thought that if he helped appellant, 
“it might be harder for me here.”  During direct examination, he did not elab-
orate on the basis for his reluctance. 
 On cross-examination, LCpl Calloway testified that he already knew appel-
lant was “in trouble” when he attended the formation at which the “jacking” 
incident was discussed.  He testified that no one threatened any repercus-
sions if he testified. When asked to explain why he was initially reluctant to 
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testify, he testified that he thought “maybe [his] leave might be cancelled or, 
you know, someone might say, well, he did that so, you know-and something 
of that matter.”  He testified that some members of the section read appel-
lant’s statement and decided not to help him, believing that “he gets what he 
deserves.”  He testified that most of the Marines in his section “don’t want to 
have anything with it just because of the way the statement was read out and 
the things they read.”  He testified, “[H]alf the people that work in my sec-
tion, they wouldn’t have anything to do with it.” 
 LCpl Calloway testified that someone in his shop had a copy of appellant’s 
statement, and it was discussed by most of the 90 people in the shop. He de-
scribed their reaction to appellant’s statement as follows: 
And it was like they were upset because they knew that he couldn’t say an-
ything, you know—he wouldn’t say anything like that. And even if he did, it 
was so dismal for him just to turn himself in and then say what he said, 
you know. It made them upset. And then you had other people who don’t 
know him who really believe he did all that stuff, and it’s weird.  It’s 
messed up. 
 On examination by the military judge, LCpl Calloway testified that those 
who did not know appellant before the incident did not want anything to do 
with him, but those who knew appellant and had favorable opinions were 
willing to come forward. LCpl Calloway testified that, when the statement was 
disclosed, he felt that “the command” would look unfavorably on those who 
were trying to help appellant. He explained that, when he said “the com-
mand,” he meant “Top Stanton, maybe the First Sergeant, the Captain, Chief 
Warrant Officer Harris.”  He explained further that he thought the command 
might disapprove of testifying for appellant because the command had talked 
about “how stupid it was and how racial and violent it was,” causing LCpl Cal-
loway to think that, if he tried to help appellant, the command might think 
that he “just want[s] to be like him.” Notwithstanding his initial reluctance, 
LCpl Calloway told the military judge that, if he testified for appellant, he was 
not concerned that his command would rate him less favorably or make it 
hard on him. 
 After LCpl Calloway and SSgt Lawson testified, the military judge sua 
sponte directed that Captain (Capt) Fuhs, 1stSgt Bressler, MSgt Stanton, and 
CWO Harris be produced to testify. 
 Capt Fuhs, appellant’s company commander, testified that the incident to 
which appellant confessed occurred on a weekend.  The NCIS delivered a 
copy of the confession to the Battalion Officer of the Day (OOD), who called 
Capt Fuhs at his quarters. Capt Fuhs took a copy of the confession home, no-
tified his executive officer of the incident, and on Monday, he made a copy of 
the statement and gave it to 1stSgt Bressler.  He told 1stSgt Bressler that he 
could use the statement, with the name and social security number blacked 
out, “to teach the staff NCOs about what’s going on with our Marines.” He 
told 1stSgt Bressler to “get the word out . . . that this type of behavior will not 
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be tolerated within this command.”  Capt Fuhs testified that, at the weekly 
company formation, he told his Marines that “we had a Marine that did some-
thing that Marines do not do, and we will not tolerate this type of behavior.”  
He quoted the portion of the statement reciting that “they thought it would be 
fun to go out and jack somebody up,” and told his Marines that he “was ap-
palled and disgusted . . . by just that type of an attitude of a U.S. Marine.” 
Capt Fuhs testified that, in a discussion with his noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) and section heads, he told them that “any Marine that would portray 
this type of behavior does not deserve to wear the uniform.” 
 Capt Fuhs testified that he had “no personal dealings” with appellant and 
had “no personal opinion as to his military character,” but that he formed an 
opinion after reading appellant’s confession. He testified that, after reading 
the confession, he “was disgusted by the behavior.” 
 1stSgt Bressler testified that, after his discussion with Capt Fuhs, he talked 
with two of the senior enlisted Marines in the unit, Master Gunnery Sergeant 
(MGSgt) Wright and MGSgt Truelove. He told them that he “felt there was a 
void in some type of leadership.”  He testified that he “was concerned that 
maybe something went wrong, and it was leadership.” He made “a couple 
copies” of the statement, one for CWO Harris, the OIC of appellant’s duty sec-
tion, and one for “the master gunny.” 
 At a regularly scheduled formation, 1stSgt Bressler had “a school circle,” at 
which he addressed “a number of things,” including the “jacking” incident. 
1stSgt Bressler described the formation as follows: 
 And basically at the formation I said that people hearing that type of 
terminology [referring to “jacking”] as good sorts or good Marines are 
more-have a responsibility to talk to their fellow neighbors about that type 
of behavior or that type of language, number one; and number two, that I 
was available to help anybody with problems or-someone that thought that 
they might have to conduct this type of behavior or this type of language-
and that we need to get in touch as Marines with each other and the envi-
ronment we live in because I felt a void. 
 I was astonished that—how could a Marine that—I mean, I had never 
heard [appellant’s] name before in our company be allegedly involved in 
something like this, and no one can tell me or give me any information on 
it. I mean, how can we let that happen? So, I felt that I needed to tell eve-
rybody you’re not in touch. I mean, we need to get-be more aware of 
what’s happening around us and with each other, and that was basically 
the point of it, sir. 
 Although 1stSgt Bressler did not mention appellant by name, he testified 
that he thought “a few people there probably knew who I was talking about,” 
particularly those Marines from appellant’s section. By this time, appellant 
was not present for duty, having been placed in pretrial confinement. 
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 1stSgt Bressler testified that he did not “personally know” appellant before 
the incident. He testified that, after reading appellant’s confession, he “was a 
little embarrassed.” He reacted to the confession by thinking, “I guess we 
have a problem. Let’s see how we can set out to fix it.” Asked about the impact 
of the confession on his opinion of appellant, the first sergeant testified that 
he did not think any more or less of appellant, because he “didn’t even recog-
nize the name.” 
 CWO Harris testified that she was uncertain how she learned about the 
incident involving appellant, but she thought it might have been from one of 
her senior staff NCOs, “because usually that’s how they come in.” She never 
received a copy of appellant’s statement, but saw a copy with appellant’s 
name blacked out. She admitted that she probably had told SSgt Lawson that 
she thought appellant was a thug. CWO Harris was asked if she thought her 
comment might have intimidated SSgt Lawson from testifying. She re-
sponded as follows: 
In the case of Staff Sergeant Lawson, no, sir, because the only reason I said 
what I said was because of what Staff Sergeant Lawson said first. Staff Ser-
geant Lawson, as I said, thinks Lance Corporal Biagase’s impeccable . . . . 
 Asked if she might have indirectly intimidated SSgt Lawson, she re-
sponded in the negative, “because I know Staff Sergeant Lawson.”  She ex-
plained that, if she had been speaking to a Marine who “was a little weak,” her 
comment may have been intimidating, but she did not think she swayed SSgt 
Lawson. 
 CWO Harris testified that her evaluation of any Marines whom she rated 
would not be affected by the fact that they testified on appellant’s behalf. She 
testified that her opinion of appellant, based on the information in his confes-
sion, “[was] totally irrelevant to what anybody else above me or below me 
thinks.” She testified that she did not know appellant “whatsoever.” 
 MSgt Stanton testified that, when he learned about the incident and saw 
appellant’s confession, he did not believe it, because “until the incident, he 
was one of the best Marines I had.” At the regularly scheduled formation, he 
told his Marines “that the military really couldn’t tolerate situations like that 
because it was unbecoming.” He told them that “when they go out in town, 
they got to conduct themselves as Marines.” MSgt Stanton did not have a 
copy of appellant’s confession at the formation, but “just went off the top of 
[his] head.” He did not mention appellant, but he believed that the Marines 
knew he was talking about appellant, because “everybody already knew he 
was in the brig.” MSgt Stanton testified that he did not feel “in any way re-
luctant” to express his favorable opinion of appellant. He did not believe that 
any of his superiors would affect his fitness reports if he testified favorably for 
appellant. 
 After the witnesses on the motion to dismiss had testified, the military 
judge asked defense counsel if any witnesses had refused to testify. Defense 
counsel responded that no witnesses had refused, but that the dissemination 
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of appellant’s statement by the command “definitely had an impact on them” 
by painting appellant as a “bad character,” even before the trial began. 
 The military judge denied the motion to dismiss.  His explanation of the 
basis for his ruling included the following comments: 
 Certainly I do not deem it appropriate that a statement of an accused be 
Xeroxed, somehow reproduced, and provided to various members of the 
command even though it may have been with good intentions; that is, even 
though it may have been for the purpose, as has been expressed here, to 
teach others of the kind of conduct that should not be tolerated. . . . How-
ever, after having heard all of the evidence to include that by the potential 
witnesses on behalf of the defense and the questioning by both counsel as 
well as that by myself, I believe the government has likewise sustained its 
burden by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful command influ-
ence did not, in fact, exist. 
 I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there has been no unlaw-
ful command influence in this case based on everything that I have heard. 
 The military judge then directed that Capt Fuhs, 1stSgt Bressler, CWO 
Harris, MSgt Stanton, and SSgt Lawson be brought into the courtroom, where 
he chastised them for distributing and commenting on appellant’s statement 
in unit formations. The military judge’s comments included the following: 
 Ladies and gentlemen, I have, after a lot of searching, denied a defense 
motion for unlawful command influence. I do not believe that there has 
been unlawful command influence. That is not to say that I do believe 
things were done properly. I believe that you have come carelessly close to 
compromising the judicial integrity of these proceedings, and I want to 
make sure that all of you understand that this is a Federal Court of the 
United States, and I will not under any circumstances tolerate anybody 
that even remotely attempts to compromise the integrity of these pro-
ceedings . . . . 
 [A]nd although I have denied the motion, I am going to take some re-
medial action. I am directing and ordering at this time that with regard to 
anyone who testified on behalf of Lance Corporal Biagase that First Ser-
geant Bressler be removed from their reporting chain, that he have no in-
fluence whatsoever over the fitness reports or pro/con marks or any evalu-
ation of anybody that testifies in these proceedings. Second of all, anyone 
who testifies in these proceedings on behalf of Lance Corporal Biagase, if 
their pro/con marks or fitness report or evaluation of any sort is lower 
than it was on their last reporting period, I am directing that written justi-
fication be attached to that. 
 The military judge further announced that he would allow the defense “a 
great deal of latitude” during voir dire of prospective court members, and 
would liberally grant challenges for cause.  Finally, he told the assembled 
members of appellant’s command: 
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Additionally, if there are witnesses which the defense desires be called on 
behalf of Lance Corporal Biagase that you are aware of that have otherwise 
been reluctant to testify out of fear or concern for their professional well 
being, I will issue a blanket order to produce any such witness. 
 The Court of Criminal Appeals came to the same conclusion as the military 
judge, stating that it was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that unlawful 
command influence, actual or apparent, did not exist,” and concluding fur-
ther that, “[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that unlawful command influence ex-
isted, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that neither the findings 
nor the sentence were affected.” Unpub. op. at 4-5. 
 Discussion 
 * * * 
 . . . [O]nce the issue of unlawful command influence is raised, the Govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the predicate facts do 
not exist; or (2) that the facts do not constitute unlawful command influence; 
or (3) that the unlawful command influence will not prejudice the proceed-
ings or did not affect the findings and sentence. Accordingly, we hold that the 
military judge erred by applying the wrong legal test when he concluded that 
the prosecution had “sustained its burden by clear and convincing evidence 
that unlawful command influence did not, in fact, exist.” 
 Notwithstanding the military judge’s use of the wrong legal test, appellant 
is not entitled to relief. The prosecution did not dispute the predicate facts, 
i.e., that various members of the chain of command disclosed the details of 
appellant’s confession to members of the unit at regularly scheduled for-
mations, and expressed strong disapproval of the conduct described in ap-
pellant’s confession.  The prosecution did not dispute that, even though ap-
pellant’s name was not disclosed, appellant’s co-workers knew he was the 
person whose confession was being discussed. The military judge recognized 
that the command’s pretrial condemnation of appellant’s conduct had the po-
tential to deter members of the command from coming forward and sup-
porting appellant. He concluded that the defense had produced “some evi-
dence,” but expressed doubt whether it was sufficient to raise the issue of 
unlawful command influence. 
 SSgt Lawson testified that his concern about his credibility as a noncom-
missioned officer was based on his feeling of guilt about the adequacy of his 
leadership, and not as a result of command pressure. He testified une-
quivocally that no one tried to intimidate him or dissuade him from testify-
ing. 
 On the other hand, LCpl Calloway was initially reluctant to testify, because 
he did not want his command to think that he wanted “to be like [appellant].” 
In short, he was afraid of guilt by association.  His fear arose from the com-
mand’s improper exploitation of appellant’s confession.  However, at the 
court-martial, he also testified that he was not concerned about any adverse 
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action if he testified for appellant.  He further testified that those Marines 
who did not know appellant before the incident did not want anything to do 
with him, but those Marines who had a favorable opinion of his conduct and 
performance before the incident were willing to come forward and testify. 
 The military judge ultimately concluded that the issue of unlawful com-
mand influence had been raised by the defense.  Because we are satisfied be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the findings and sentence were unaffected, we 
need not review or disturb his ruling that the issue wasraised; nor do we find 
prejudice from his use of the wrong legal test. 
 * * * 
 The best indicator of the lack of prejudice is the fact that all the members 
of appellant’s chain of command who knew him testified favorably. Four non-
commissioned officers, MSgt Stanton, SSgt Lawson, Sgt Thomas, and Cpl 
Gibbs, all gave strong and favorable testimony on findings as well as sen-
tence. The three members of his chain of command who did not testify for 
appellant (Capt Fuhs, 1stSgt Bressler, and CWO Harris) testified during the 
motion hearing that they had no personal knowledge of appellant’s military 
qualities. LCpl Calloway, who testified on the motion to dismiss, expressed 
his willingness to testify during the motion hearing, but was not called as a 
character witness, for reasons not disclosed by the record. Defense counsel 
stated on the record that no witnesses had refused to testify. To date, appel-
lant has proffered no evidence that any witnesses were deterred from testify-
ing. Accordingly, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the findings 
and sentence were untainted by unlawful command influence. 
 * * * 
 The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal 
Appeals is affirmed. 
SULLIVAN, Judge (concurring in the result): 
 * * * 
 . . . I agree with the result of the majority opinion. Its prejudice analysis 
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not harmed by the mis-
guided actions of his military superiors. The real hero in this case is the mili-
tary judge, who took strong steps to insure (1) that the jury and witness pools 
were not poisoned; and (2) that appellant received a fair trial. 
Points for Discussion 
 1. Commanders cannot be indifferent to crimes committed by members of 
their units.  But they must be very careful about what they say.  Commenting 
on the Biagase decision, then-Lieutenant Colonel Mark Johnson wrote:  “If 
commanders must address [crime within a unit] they are reminded to talk 
about the offense, rather than the offender, and the process, rather than the 
result.”  ,Mark L. Johnson, Unlawful Command Influence—Still with Us; 
Perspectives of the Chair in the Continuing Struggle against the “Mortal En-
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emy” of Military Justice, Army Lawyer, Jun. 2008 at 104, 111.  What are ex-
amples of what commanders can say and cannot say? 
 2. Is there anything analogous to unlawful command influence in the civil-
ian context?  Could the mayor of a city urge citizens to be “tough on crime” 
when sitting on juries?  How is the military different? 
 
UNITED STATES v. BALDWIN 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
54 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2001) 
Judge SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 During the fall of 1997 and in February of 1998, appellant [Captain Holly 
Baldwin, U.S. Army] was tried by a general court-martial composed of officer 
members at Fort Bliss, Texas. Contrary to her pleas, she was found guilty of 
two specifications of larceny, conduct unbecoming an officer, and two specifi-
cations of service-discrediting conduct (mail tampering and obstruction of 
justice), in violation of Articles 121, 133, and 134, Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 921, 933, and 934, respectively. The military judge then 
dismissed the two larceny specifications as multiplicious with the remaining 
offenses, and the members sentenced appellant to a dismissal, 1 year’s con-
finement, and total forfeitures on February 6, 1998. The convening authority 
on May 19, 1998, approved this sentence, and the Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed on October 1, 1999. 
 On May 19, 2000, this Court granted review on the following [issue] of 
law: 
I. WHETHER THE CONVENING AUTHORITY EXERCISED UNLAWFUL 
COMMAND INFLUENCE OVER THE PROCEEDINGS BY REQUIRING 
THE COURT MEMBERS, IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TRIAL, TO ATTEND 
AN OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WHERE 
“APPROPRIATE” PUNISHMENTS FOR OFFICER COURT–MARTIAL 
DEFENDANTS WAS DISCUSSED. 
* * * 
 Nine months after her court-martial, appellant signed a statement and lat-
er filed it with the Court of Criminal Appeals. See United States v. Grostefon, 
12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).  It said: 
AFFADAVIT [sic] 
November 20, 1998 
 I, Holly M. Baldwin, would like to make the following statement. Short-
ly after I was transferred from Fort Lewis to Fort Bliss (fall 1997), Ft. Bliss 
was having a Family Values Week. One of the Officer Professional Devel-
opment programs mandated by Commanding General Costello was one 
directed at Ethics. At that particular OPD, one of the topics discussed was 
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an incident that happened with three of the Officers in the 31st ADA BDE 
that were being court-martialed. The address included comments that the 
court-martial sentences were too lenient and that the minimum sentence 
should be at least one year and that Officers should be punished harsher 
than enlisted soldiers because Officers should always set the example and 
be above reproach. The day after this OPD one of the officers from the 31st 
was set to be sentenced. I believe his name was Major Brennan. I attended 
this OPD, but didn’t learn of the sentencing until a discussion I had with 
his attorney, Mr. Jim Maus. He is an attorney in my civilian attorney’s 
(Jim Darnell) law office in El Paso, TX. Mr. Maus was Major Brennan’s ci-
vilian counsel. Mr. Maus also informed me that this type of OPD was 
inappropriate and that it could be considered jury tampering and he was 
filing an appeal on Major Brennan’s behalf stating such. 
 On the day of my conviction and sentencing, the final part of the trial 
was delayed for another OPD that was mandatory for all Officers on post. 
This OPD dealt with the situation Lt. Kelly Flynn was embroiled [sic].* The 
theme about this OPD was that she was not punished as she should have 
been and that she had basically gotten over. It was then stated she should 
not have been allowed to resign, but should have been court-martialed. I 
would also like to note here that I submitted a Resignation for Good of 
Service [sic] on or about 1 May 97 and it was held and never sent up as the 
regulation states. That afternoon after the officers on my panel went to the 
OPD, I was convicted and sentenced to 1 year at Ft. Leavenworth. It should 
also be noted that 4 of the officers on my panel were in the same rating 
chain. They included the Brigade Commander, Brigade Deputy Com-
mander, the HHC Company Commander and another BDE Primary Of-
ficer. 
 I swear the above mentioned statement is true to the best of knowledge. 
Signed Holly Morris Baldwin 
Date November 20, 1998 
(Emphasis added). 
 Appellant argued that “her sentence to one year in confinement and the 
rejection of her request for Resignation for the Good of the Service was the 
result of these actions, which clearly constitute unlawful command influence 
in this case.” The Government did not oppose this motion to file, but in its 
final  brief it simply asserted that “it [appellant’s claim] lacks merit.” The 
Court of Criminal Appeals summarily affirmed this case. 
 * * * 
                                                          
* Air Force First Lieutenant Kelly Flinn was the first female assigned to pilot a B-52 
aircraft.  She was allowed to resign from the Air Force after being charged with 
making a false official statement, committing adultery with a subordinate’s spouse, 
and disobeying an order.  Her case received national media attention in 1997.—Eds. 
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 The Government argues that appellant’s post-trial claim of unlawful com-
mand influence should be denied because she “has failed to meet her thresh-
old burden of production in this case.” Final Brief at 7. It further contends 
that “[a]ppellant’s own ambiguous, self-serving, and unsubstantiated decla-
ration does not establish a viable claim of unlawful command influence.” 
Moreover, it notes that “appellant never raised this issue at trial” nor made 
any “effort to bring this allegation to the military judge’s attention and con-
duct some minimal voir dire before findings and sentence deliberations.” Id. 
We conclude that none of these reasons legally justifies the lower appellate 
court’s summary denial of appellant’s post-trial claim of unlawful command 
influence. 
 Article 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837, states: 
§ 837. Art. 37. Unlawfully influencing action of court 
 (a) No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-mar-
tial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure, reprimand, or ad-
monish the court or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with 
respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect 
to any other exercises of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceed-
ings. No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any 
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other 
military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sen-
tence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing 
authority with respect to his judicial acts. The foregoing provisions of the 
subsection shall not apply with respect to (1) general instructional or in-
formational courses in military justice if such courses are designed solely 
for the purpose of instructing members of a command in the substantive 
and procedural aspects of courts-martial, or (2) to statements and instruc-
tions given in open court by the military judge, president of a special 
court-martial, or counsel. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 We have long held that the use of command meetings to purposefully in-
fluence the members in determining a court-martial sentence violates Article 
37, UCMJ. United States v. Levite, 25 M.J. 334, 339 (C.M.A. 1987); United 
States v. Cruz, 25 M.J. 326, 329 (C.M.A. 1987); United States v. Thomas, 22 
M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. McCann, 8 U.S.C.MA 675, 676, 
25 CMR 179, 180 (1958). Moreover, we have also held that the mere “conflu-
ence” of the timing of such meetings with members during ongoing courts-
martials and their subject matter dealing with court-martial sentences can 
require a sentence rehearing. See United States v. Brice, 19 M.J. 170, 172 n. 3 
(C.M.A. 1985). 
 Here, appellant avers that there were two command officer meetings be-
fore and during her court-martial, which she and the officers of her panel at-
tended. She also avers that various court-martial situations on base and in the 
Air Force at large were discussed. Furthermore, she asserts that comments 
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were made that court-martial sentences were too lenient; that officers should 
always be punished more harshly than enlisted persons; and that the mini-
mum sentences should be 1 year. Finally, appellant points out that she, an 
officer, subsequently received a 1–year sentence at her court-martial. If ap-
pellant’s averments are true, then as in Brice, a confluence of timing and 
subject matter would exist. 
 The Government contends, however, that appellant’s self-serving aver-
ments are not legally sufficient (or competent) to raise her post-trial claim. 
We disagree. In United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296, 300 (1995), this  Court 
held that “[t]he quantum of evidence necessary to raise unlawful command 
influence is the same as that required to submit a factual issue to the trier of 
fact.” While not particularly delineating the proof required, we have generally 
held that it must be more than “mere speculation.” See United States v. 
Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (1999). Here, appellant’s post-trial statement was 
based on her own observations (cf. United States v. Ruiz, 49 M.J. 340, 348 
(1998) (no abuse of discretion for convening authority to refuse to order post-
trial hearing on basis of unsubstantiated assertions of unlawful command in-
fluence by counsel)), and it was detailed in nature. Cf. United States v. 
Johnston, 39 M.J. 242, 244 (C.M.A. 1994) (must be more than a bare allega-
tion). Moreover, the record of trial, which contains an unexplained decision 
to delay any sessions on the date in question until the early afternoon, may be 
viewed as tending to corroborate appellant’s allegation that there was a com-
mand meeting at that time. In the absence of any post-trial submission from 
the Government, we conclude appellant’s allegations in this context are suffi-
cient to raise a post-trial complaint of unlawful command influence. See 
United States v. Ayala, supra (some evidence to which a member might rea-
sonably attach credit); see generally United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 248 
(1997) (third principle: “if the affidavit is factually adequate on its face to 
state a claim of legal error . . . .”). 
 Although we reject the Government’s legal insufficiency claim, we are re-
luctant to order relief without a complete record concerning appellant’s claim. 
A full development of the material facts surrounding these command meet-
ings and their effect on appellant’s court-martial is required.  See United 
States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270; see also United States v. Fricke, 53 M.J. 149, 
155 (2000).  Accordingly, [an evidentiary] hearing should be ordered. 
 * * * 
 The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is set 
aside.  The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the 
Army for submission to a convening authority for a limited hearing on the 
issue of command influence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge will 
make specific findings of fact on that issue. A verbatim record of the pro-
ceedings will be submitted after authentication to the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals for further review. Thereafter, Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 867(a)(3), shall apply. 
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Points for Discussion 
 1.  If General Costello is responsible for maintaining good order and disci-
pline, what is wrong with expressing his opinion on minimum sentences and 
whether soldiers accused of wrongdoing should be allowed to resign?  Sup-
pose a civilian mayor of a town gave a speech urging prosecutors, judges, and 
juries to get tough on crime.  Would that prevent fair trials in the town?  
Would criminal convictions have to be reversed? 
 2. What is the remedy for General Costello’s action?  Can there be no more 
trials at Fort Bliss after his speech? 
